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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A central theme in the first half of the eleventh chapter in Pa.rt 
l' 1· . 
II of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is '' 'Seeing 
l·· ' ' ' 
a.111 ••• ,· is not part of perception. 11 1 Tlll.e purpose of this pa.per is to 
. . 
understand and appreciate the significance of this claim. In order to 
understand this theme I shall first introduce the concept 'seeing as' 
by presenting several illustrations regarded as paradigm cases of 
'seeing as'. After this familiarization with the legitimate uses of 
'seeing as',. I shall illustrate several ways in which the concept has 
become a part of theories of perception. I will conclude this chapter 
with reasons for saying, 11 'Seeing as~··' is not part of perception." 
" 
Paradigm Uses of 'Seeing As• 
Figure 1. The Duck-rabbit2 
Figure 1 is an ambiguous figure that can be seen as a picture of a 
duck or as a picture of a rabbit. Wittgenstein calls this experience 
of seeing the same a:rawing in different way~ "noticing an aspect. 113 A 
l 
2 
person eeeing this figure may simply see it as a duck. If asked, "What 
do y@u see?" -- he weuld simply answer, "A picture 0f a duck," or "I 
aee a duck." Later when he under11taJ1.ds that it ie an ambigueua figure 
that can alee be seea as a rabbit, he weuld reply, "I see it as a 
duck." S0me pet>ple see the a•pect change, that is, see it first as a 
rabbit, then as a duck. They might respond te the question,"What de> 
yeu see?" with "New I'm seeing it as a rabbit." To learn how another 
person sees the drawing, we can show him the figure and ask him what he 
:aew aeea it as. His respo1u11e might be "A picture 0f a duck" or he could 
point to real ducks er draw us a picture ef a duck. If however he drew 
aa exact copy of the figure th~t he sees or described in detail the 
color aitd shapes he saw, it would not tell us what he ~aw it as. 
'Seeing as' can alse be used in connectien with Figure 2. 
Figure 2o Triangle Figure 
Wittgenstein says4 we can see this figure as a geemetrical drawing, as 
a hele, as a mountain, as a wedge, as an object that has fallen over, 
as hanging from the apex and as numerous other thingso In both the 
duck-rabbit figure ai:i.d thia triangle figure in order to see the various 
aspects, ene has to be familiar with certain objects. We can't see the 
duck-rabbit as a duck unless we are familiar with the shape of ducks. 
We can't see the triangle as a wedge or a mountain unless we are fami-
liar with wedges and meuntainso A difference in the caee of seeing the 
triangle as variQUS things and seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit or as 
a duck is that seeing the triangle as semething fallen ever takes imag-
ination, whereas •'eeing the duck-rabbit as a duck or rabbit dees l'Hllt o 
3 
With the duck-rabbit we might mistakenly believe that it was a picture 
of enly a rabbit. We might •imply not be aware that it was an ambiguous 
figure. We cannet simply see the bare triangle as something fallen.5 
Another ef Wittgenstein's examples ef 'seeing as' involving 1magin~~ion 
is. a game in which the children take crates or boxes to be a h~use. 
6 Here we ce~ld say the children see the crates as a h~use. 
Figure J Carl be seen as a white cress en a black background er as 
a black cress en a white backgr0und. 
Figure 3. The Double Cress 
This illustration differs from both the previeus ones in that here one 
ceuld show someone the two ways the figure can be seen simply by point-
ing to a part ef the drawing. He w0uld •imply point te the c0ler of 
triangle that forms the cross in order te have that cress stand eut. A 
I 
secend difference between the deuble areas and the earlier illustrations 
is that in the earlier ones it would be Receasary te have a familiarity 
with certain ebjects in order te see the various aspects. With the dou-
ble cress 
One ceuld quite well imagine this as a 
primitive reactielll ~n a'child even be-
fere he ceuld talk. 
A final figure that will illustrate the use of 'seeing as' is 
Figure 4. 
Figure 4. The Staircase Figure 
4 
This figu.re can either be seen as a staircase or as an overhanging cor-
niceo This figu.re is important to us because here, as in one of the 
previous drawings, we are involved with the possibi~ity of illusion.9 
A more common use than with these illustrations found in introduc-
tory psychology textbooks is the use of 'seeing as' in aestheticso We 
are sometimes told in order to fully appreciate a painting we must see 
the ball in the painting as actually floating. Or we must see an ob-
ject as solid or as extending into viewer spaceo With music we are 
told to hear a bar as an introduction. There are also some uses of 
'seeing as' that do not become involved in theories of perception. For 
example, in discussions of symbolism it is common to hear, "I saw that 
as meaning •••• " Also there are sentences such as, "A graduate student 
might see his .thesis as an insurmountable task." In these two examples 
there is no temptation to regard 'seeing as' as part of perception. 
Two Ways 'Seeing As' Becomes Involved 
in Theorie.s of Perception 
The previous figures illustrate the paradigm.use of 'seeing as'. 
In these cases we don't say we see1 the same thing and describe it dif-
ferently but rather that we see the same thing differently. In the 
history of philosophy there is not a continuous argument with different 
schools on how we discuss ambiguous figures. So how does the 'seeing 
as' locu:tion .. enter into, philosophical discussion? 
One way •seeing as' becomes a part of philosophical theories of 
perception is in the disc.ussion of illusionso Illusions are of central 
importance in tkeories of perception. R.J.Hirst in discussing the role 
of illusions as one of the facts that must be taken into account in any 
fully adequate view of perception makes tne following statement: 
But even if peroeiv~ng a round table as round .. 
or in perspective as elliptical is taken.as 
immediate' confrontation needing no furth:er 
analysis, seeing a stick as a dagger (or a 
piece of wax as a tomato or a busk in a fog 
as a man) can 1.llardly be equally simple and 
immediate. In suck oases and in .. halluaina.-
tions one R.as to admit tllat one seems to see 
an object quite.different from that present 
.to tke senses. This can fairly be describ.ed 
as perceptual consciousness of tl!l.e (osten-
sible) objeot.(dagger, wax or man) and dis-
tinguished in analysis from actually perceiv-
ing an object {dagger, wax or man). And in 
view of the subjective similarity it is but 
a short step to suppose ,that perceptual con-
'.sciousness of X' also occurs in perceiving X 
as X; .tl.lle difference is between illusory and 
veridical perception of an X lying not in tl.lle 
common consciousness but in whether X is pre-
sent and acting on the same organs. Any plllilo-
sophy of perception skould analyze this per-
ceptual consciousness and explain how it may 
occur without the presence of tae correspond-
ing object. 10 · 
So the •seeing as' loout'ion is used to express illusions. Illusions 
are important in theories of perception because, as in tl!l.e above case, 
5 
these illusions seem to indicate the need to analyze seeing into a step 
that goes. unnoticed in veridical perception. That is, explanation is 
necessary wl.llenever what we describe as seeing does not correspond to 
what is there to see. Even tno\igh, when we say we see a bent stick in 
the water, we are correct~d and told it is a straight stick tkat we see, 
~e find it essential to distinguish this mistake from a lie or not know-
ing what bent sticks are. After 8'.11, we didn't just say 'bent stick', 
but we ,~really saw it a.s bent. ~e s,em to have th.e same rea11on or ca.use 
to sa.y,,bent stick in the case of illusions a.s we do when there is actu-
ally a. bent stick. So our analysis of seeing seems tQ require an ele-
·,. . 
ment called perceptual consciousness, visual experience or sometking of 
which we are immediately awareo 
6 
Ambiguou~ figures also seem to indicate the need for a perceptual 
consciousness or visual experience. With an ambiguous figure we some-
times see it first as a rabbit, then as a duck. So it seems as if 
something must be changing and since the figure does not change, it 
·' 
. . . \ . ~ ' 
must be something mental that changes. To indicate that 'sensa' a.re to 
l • 
some degree mind-dependent, Charles D. Broad says: 
Wllen I look at the 'sitaircase figure",· which. is 
given in most p.sychology text-books as an. ins.ta.nee. 
of ambiguous figures, it seems to me that .it ac-
tually looks sensibly different from time to 
time. Its sensible appearance changes 1witlt a 
click' , as I look at it, from that 1~f a stair.case 
to that of an overhanging cornice. 
So in tltinking about perception, it has seemed essential to note 
that people sometimes see things differently than they are, i.e., cases 
of illusions •. ' Also ambiguous figures give us cases in which one person 
sees the same thing differently at different times or sees it differ-
ently than anotlter persop. sees it. Wittgenstein states: 
': ::. ·We said that one reason for introducing the idea. 
of sense-datum was that people, as we say, some-
,,,,, ·:·::time1r:·1;see different. th.ing~, colors, e.g., looking 
at the same object.12 
What Wittgenstein says here of sense-data is similar to what I have 
said about perceptual consciousness and sensa. We have seen then that 
one way tJae expression •seeing as' enters into taeories of perception 
is that it is used to express illusions and to state the way we see am-
biguous figures. Illusions and ambiguous figures are thought to illus-
trate tkat.seeing involves sense-data or perceptual consciousnes11. 
Tkeori4jas_ o;f_~perception must explain th.e connection between sense-data. 
or perceptual consciousness and the objects that we perceive. 
A second way •seeing-'as' becomes involved in philosophical discus-
sion is witlt the question, "What do you really lll!ile?" We are familiar 
with a similar question in a context such as a husband admonishing his 
-
easily frightened wife with "Did you really aee the burglar?" and her 
subsequential more accurate description; "Well, no, but I saw something 
l 
'· ' 
' 
move." However, "Do you really see a house or do you just see the sur-
face of the front of the house and reason that it is a house."-- is a 
different type question and one with which we are not familiar. When 
the husband asks his wife if she really saw a burglar, he implies that 
he doubts there actually was a burglar. However, the unfamiliar ques~ 
tion does not imply that there was not actually a house. It is rather 
a question about how we know there is a house. At first we are inclin-
ed to answer that we just see the house. But if someone persists in 
asking what we really saw, indicating that we could not h.ave seen the 
complete house from any one position, we don't feel capable of provid-
ing the accurate description of what we saw that he demands. No de-
scription seems possible. I can't name 'things like houses, buildings, 
1 
trees because all that I really see must be the surface of these objects 
I 
and at a particular angle. 
. ' 
All t4e things I name llave more than a pure-
, 
ly visual reference. Perhaps I should make a wax mode'l to show what I 
seeo But ·the wax,mod~l would also have more than just a surface. A 
shell model of the objects would have a back side and a cardboard mo-
del would have to have supports. Perhaps the correct way to represent 
what I see is with a painting. 13 But a painting is only two dimension-
alo 
'Tis commonly allow'd by pkilosophers that 
all bodies, which discover themselves to the eye, 
appear as if painted on a plain surface, and that 
their different degrees of remoteness from our-
selves are discovered more by reason t~an by the 
senses. 14 
So perhaps what I really see is a painted canvas and I only reason that 
the objects are in a three dimensional space. But then what about the 
edges of objects in the painting; should they be blurred or sharp and 
clear? To show what you really saw does one paint eacl$. strand of hair 
separately or simply paint a colored patch?15 
This inclination to ask, "What do you really see?" seems to come 
8 
from both epistemology and science. In much of epistemology there is a 
search for fundamental statements that we can use as our basic building 
blocks of knowledge. We do not want to make an error in these fund.amen-
tal statements by inferring from such information as the surface to the 
claim that what we see is an object. We want to make the smallest pos-
' I' I . . 
sible commitment in these fundamental statements~ Statements reporting 
the·· colors and sllapef!J seem to involve the least amount of inference and 
so the least chance of error, and so are the most accurate description 
of what we see. So it seems as if the answer to "What do you really 
see?", so far as it could be answered, shou~d be in terms of colors and 
J 
shapes. 
The same temptation to give the ideal description of what we see 
I •· 
comes from the sciences. 
I 
' 
·Science tells us there is-a pattern of excita-
, I 
tion on the retina. Excitations on the retina would then seem to be at 
least a component of seeing. The prooe~s of seeing seems to ha.veto get 
\ 
us from these excitations to houses and things we normally claim to see. 
We normally see much more than the color patches or the excitations 
that we seem reduced to in order to answer the question, "What do you 
really see?" We see the building aordss the street, the oar passing in 
' I 
front of it and the tree bending in the breeze. We have to get from 
the exact description of what we see that we were. tempted into giving 
to the tkings we see. Given excitations or patches of color, how is it 
9 
that we see abjects? A pessibility seem• te be that we see the patches 
of colors !! objects. 
Thus who I l••k at a heu.ae, my ae1uae-datum is 
in. actual fact a celli11ti.tuen.t ef the fret wall 
at mut (1u~t Gf the back er inside 0w.alls. or 
:reef) a.ad •nly ef the frent surfac..e of.that. 
But i• it eJJ.ly this !Den.1; surface.th.at I am per-
ceptualiy ceas.cieua ef? · N•t at all. What .ill 
befere my mi:iid. is a heuse with feur outlilide 
walls udlllaJlY inside e:nes: all this aad :m..ethimg 
less is what I take to exist. And 11et u.ly se: 
what I take to exist is eftea net just a houa.e 
but a particular heuse, with auch and such.a. 
part.icular aort of back (though it is en.ly the 
fre:n.t part that is prese11.t te my seJ1.ses) and · 
suohuui au.oh a'Ht ~f rooms, thus an.d thus si-
tuated. Of ceurse it may ••t ill fact be th&t 
particular heuse, say Mr. Je:m.es'&; it may •et be 
a houae · a.t all-:-I may be. havi•g an .. halluain.& ... 
tien. Still I do .!!!. it !!. Mr. Jom.es"s heuae. 16 
Se part ef seei:ng the buildimg acress the street is seeing it as a 
building acress the street. 
This,invelveme11t ef •aeei:ag as' in theeries ef perceptien might be 
illustrated by a pe·rsem leekim.g at the duck-rabbit a:m.d mot beb.g able 
to see it as either the duck 0r the rabbit am.d then finally seeing it 
as say the duck. We might want te insist that seeing the figure as a 
l ' 
duck was mere tham. ju11t seeing the li11.es ;in the drawing with•ut &BY er-
ganization. Here we get the idea that aemething is added to the simple 
seeing of the limes whem they are seen.as semething. It ia as if seeing 
the limes as a duck had two elements: a simple seeing a.n.d s•methi•g 
mQre. The simple seeing is like the seeing ef celer patchea •r the ex-
. citations. The request fer am. accurate descriptiem ef •eei:w.g is te un-
derstand what we simply see with mething added. The sece•d element is 
that we metice that what we see in the pure way cempares with my mental 
image 0f a duck. If it matches faverably, we repert the infermatien the 
comparisem. gi vee by &iaying, "I &1ee the lines &rill a duck." s. te explain 
10 
seeing, we analyze 'seeing as' into a senserYi seak:ing up of the visual 
impressi0n and the cegnitive cempari:mg •f this te eur memtal images. 
Im this way the•ries ef perceptiem take 'seeing as' to be the link 
between seasations and information abeut the world. Or said in d±ff er-
ent terms, 'seeing as' is thought 'to provide us with the link between 
the immediate experience inv0lved in seeiRg an.d what we believe a.bC11ut 
what we see. Den L0cke in trying te figure out hew ideas are 'blended' 
with immediate experience in perceiving that something is such and such 
says: 
.. 
It seems to be a necessary truth that wpeAever I 
perceive am.ythi:ng I perceive it as semethin.g--as 
a piece Gf chalk, •r as a cigarette, 0r as a white 
cyiintlrical ebject, er as a white blur en the edge 
ef my.visual field--se perhaps to take it te be 
a piece ef chalk is to see it as a piece of chalk, 
while to take it t• be a cigarette is to see it 
as a cigarette? For, as Wittgeastein points eut, 
the cencept ef 1 seeiRg as' is one where the con-
cepts ef seeing and thinking overlap. 17 
In contrast to these ways 'seeing as' is said to be involved in 
perception we have Wittgenstein's remark, " •Seeing as ••• • is not part 
ef perceptielll. 11 This is nC!lt the cem.clusien fr0m years of work in a lab-
oratory. It is a statement ab@ut co~cepts. The concept 'seeing as' is 
not part of the concept 'perceptien' as 'seeing' ~d 'hearing' often 
are. In ether words, the cencept of 'seeing as' is a distinct cgncept 
from 'seeing' used tG make perception reports. This will mean that 
tseeing' and 'seeing as' have a different function, different criteria, 
-\. 
and are taught differently. 
It should be seen from the previous material that 'seeing as' has 
often formed a part of a theery ef,perceptien either by the theery find-
., 
ing it important te account for ambiguous figures and illusions stated 
I 
in the •seeing as' locution, or as a way te explain the difference be-
11 
tween the ideal description of what we see and the way we normally des-
cribe what we see. Wittgenstein's statement is then a rather radical 
departure from much of the work previously done in attempting to give 
an adequate account of perception. What previous theories of peroep-
tion were attempting to account for Wittgenstein claims is not a part 
of perception. 
Differences between the Concepts 
'Seeing' and 'Seeing As' 
It is important in establishing that 'seeing' and •seeing as' are 
different concepts to note that tne object of sight in •seeing' is dif-
ferent from the 'object' of sight in 'seeing as 1 • 18 Consider the case 
of two men hunting for ducks. One man calls, "I see one--over there on 
the far side of the reeda!tt This would be a perception report and the 
obje,ct of sight is obviously a. duck. Compare this to staring at an am-
biguous figure and exclaiming, ":Now I see it as a duck." Here we might 
say the 'object' of sight is the duck aspect. The hunter can draw an 
exact copy of what he saw to show hie companion that he saw a duck. The 
hunter can point to the duck. The duck aspect can be pointed out or 
taugb.t but not pointed too 
Remember that with the ambiguous figure no one sees a duck or a 
picture of a duck.; There is no duck to see. If someone actually sees 
a duck, then there would have to be a duck. With the duck-rabbit there 
is not a duck nor is there a picture of a duck. There is an ambiguous 
figure that can be seen as a d~ck, but no duck. Most people can see the 
ambiguous figure as a duck but no one by looking at it can see a duck. 
This is not an empirical generalization but a simple fact about the cpn-
cept·s 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. If someone thought th.e figure was sim-
12 
ply a picture of a duck, we could understand why he made such a mis-
take. 
A second point in noting the difference in the concepts 'seeing' 
and 'seeing as' is to be aware of the difference in circumstances and 
functions of the two concepts. A paradigm situation of a perception 
report is one in wkich one person has a better view than others. The 
report then serves to inform the others what is there. The question, 
.. 
"What is there?" is synohyllloua with ·~What can you see?" in these si tua-
tions. With the ambiguous figure both people have the same view and 
"What do you see?" could not be replaced by "What.is there?" 
Another difference is that we ,can command someone to see the ambi-
guous figure as a duck , but we cannot co~and someone to see a duck. 
There is a command such as "Now see the staircase figure as a staircase 
and draw a figure climbing the stairs." - but not a context or function 
for a sentence like, "Now see this staircase." Also there is no teach-
ing someone to see ducks. Of course we do have to teach a person to 
recognize ducks. A pers.on that can 1 t recognize a duck still sees ducks. 
But a person that can't recognize ducks can't see the figure as a ducko 
Even a person that can recognize ducks won't necessarily be able to see 
the figure as a duck. Sometimes we have to hold the drawing at differ-
ent angles to help a person see the aspect. This is more obvious in 
examples such as the face-vase puzzle or the wife-mother-in-law puzzle 
in which there is sometimes real difficulty in seeing one aspect. 
It is not that it is an empirical generalization that it takes a 
certain know-how to be able to 'see as'. It is that one of the criter-
ia for 'seeing as' is the way one behaves towards the object. We only 
say that a person 'sees it as' if he can unhesitatingly make certain 
13 
applications of the figure. For example, a person that can be said to 
see it as a rabbit would be able to draw teeth for the rabbit and the 
person seeing it as a stairc~se could draw a person climbing up the 
• 
stairs. In order for us to say a person can 'see it as', that person 
has to be capable of performing these sorts of tasks. It is not that 
one has to learn something before it clicks for him, but rather that we 
would correct our claim that he •sees as' if he were not able to per.;. 
form these tasks. On the other hand, given that the person is not blind 
th.ere is no task or technique he has to be able to maste~ b~fore we say 
he sees a duck. 
I shall mention a similarity between 'seeing' and 'seeing as', for 
there are similarities, and the mistake is in thinking there are no dif-
ferences. One reaeon,we use the expression 'seeing as' ratb.er than 'in-
terpret• or 'know' is that with 'seeing as' like 'seeing' we do not 
' I 
treat the object as if it was one of several possibilitieso That is, 
the way we react to the object of sight is not one of considering alter-
nativeso This is connected with the fact that we verify •seeing as' and 
'seeing' claims much the sameo 
In order to more completely understand and appreciate Wittgen-
stein's claim that" iseeing as.oa 1 is not part of perception," I sh.all 
show the.importance of fai~ing to recognize the conceptual differences 
between 'seeing• and 'seeing as' in three theories of perception. I 
will first consider the theory of perception found in Clarence Irving 
Lewis' 'Mind.smf!,~ World Ordero M~ primary reason for considering this 
work is to point out the problems to which the assimilation of 'seeing 
as 1 to •seeing' can lead. It is important to see that this assimilation 
would lead·to problems in order to realize th.e importance of emphasiz-
14 
ing the differences in these concepts. N~xt I s~all discuss the claim 
of Godfrey N.A. Vesey tla.at "All seeing is seeing as." Understandi~ 
why this claim was made and why 1it is wrong will lead to clearer under~ 
standing of the difference in 'seeing' and •seeing as' and related con-
cepts such as 'looks like' and 'recognize•. The third theory that I 
will consider is that of Russell Norwood Hanson. He argues t:Rat an 
analysis of 'seeing' not involving •seeing as' is absurd. He insists 
that the concept 'seeing as' illuminates •seeing' by showing that per-
ception involves conceptual organization. 
NOTES 
1Ludwig Wi ttgen~tei•, Phil.osephical In.vestig.tig:u (New Yelk, 1958), 
p.194" .. The r.el.evu.t. pages i•. this chapter are PP•- 192-214. I. shall 
mete the paas.age to which refereace. is. ~e by giving the page aumber 
fellewed by a :number illdicatimg whiohpa•sage ell the page is referred 
to with the first beginning paragraph that is a separate pass~e beimg 
:number ene. 
-2_;:._,;., __ - -·;·:''<'.';•;, .. c-. 
,-.·!i>ili;·,. -:p~··-194~1 
:1 . ~ ~ ·' '. ·. ,. . 
;.b'd 193 3 
· l 1 • , P• - -
4
·b'd 200 3 11.,p. -
5ibid., P· 201...a 
6i'bid., P• 206-5 
7 ibid., P• 207-3 
8
·b'd 1 l • ' p. 207-6 
91bid.' p. 208-1 
10R.J .Hirst,. ''P.e~c~ti•lll", 1The En.eyclepe.SaH ef Phile:seph.y, ed P. 
Edward,s (:new Yerk, 1967), p.· Bo. ·I believe the iienteaee: "This caa 
fairly be described as perceptual ca•11oi.eunesl!!J. •f the (.e11.t.eaaibte) eb-
ject (dagger, wax er.mu) and distimgu.ish.Eild in aaalysis from actually 
perceivilllg an el;>ject. (dagger, wax er .. maJt.) 11 sheuld actually 'read, -"This 
caa fairly be described as perceptual ceascteusness of the (esteaaible 
meuil'ig 'apparem.t') '8b.j.ect {.dagger, tt11nate er m) ud distillgll.ished in 
ualysis frem actually perceivi:qg p. ebjeot -(stick, wax er bush).." 
110.D.:Bread, "The Theery of Se:as&~.' _ Perceiving, Se•siM a:ad 
Knowing, ed,.. R.J .Swartz (New Yark, 1965~, p'. 108. · '-
1,2wi ttgeJJ.steim., "N•tes fer Lecture& em 1 Private Experie•ce' ud 
'Se!lse.,·:Dat:a' ", ed. Rush Rhees, Philesephical Review, LXXVll (1968), 
;Po 316. 
13cr. Wi ttge:astein., 11N0tes •• 1 Phileeophical Psycholegy' ", i:n 
private oirculati••• p. 90. 
14David HUD)e, A Treatise ,of Human. Value, ed. L.A. Selby~igge 
(Oxford, l.888). . 
'1 
15 
~5I believe I am indebted te Wittge•stein fer this qu.eati••· 
16H.H;;,Prioe, Peroe2ti•1'- (Lelldt:a, 1932), p. 152. His italics. 
17Den:Leolce, "Peroeivi~ ud Thilllkiag", Ar~stotelia:a Seoiety fer 
the Systema.tio Study ef Phileliileph.y, Suppleme•tary Velum.a XLII (1968), 
I . , ..--
P• 175• · . 
18· '-
. Wittge:astein, Philesephioal Investigatie••· Cf. p. 193-1. 
19.b."d 213 5 J. J. • t P• - • 
16 
CHAPTER II 
INTERPRETING PRESENTATIONS 
c. I. Lewis' theory of perception in ~and 1h! World ~ in-
volves &E. assimilation of the concepts 'seeing' and •seeing as'. An ex-
amination of this theory will show that overlooking the differences in 
these concepts was an important factor in Lewis' theory and responsible 
for some of the theory's inadequacies. I shall first give a general ac-
count of Lewis' theory of perception and then examine in greater detail 
the two elements in his analysis of 'perception'. 
Lewis' Theory 
One of Lewis' "principal theses" in Mind !ill! 1h!, World ~ is 
that there are two elements in knowledge that must be distinguished: a 
.· ... ·~.\ . .. , ,:.,,. .!..'.: ,. 1 
cognitive element and a sensory ele~ent. Lewis believes this to be 
such a fundamental fact that every adequate theory of knowledge accepts 
it as trueo Theories such as idealism and realism often seem to omit 
one of these elements in their analysis of the nature of knowledge, but 
actually they simply overatreas one element. If a theory of knowledge 
did not contain a cognitive element, then knowledge would just be what 
was sensory, and there would be no account of the distinction between 
illusory and veridical perception. On the other hand, every theory, 
even idealism, must admit that there is something semsory in experience 
that cannot be altered by mind. Every experience so far as it has more 
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than just an aesthetic quality, accerding to Lewie, contains a cognitive 
and a sensory element. 
, .. 
There are im eur cegnitive exptirieJ1.ce two ele-
ments: the immediate data, such a.a those ef 
sense, which are presented er given te the mind, 
and a ferm, cen1Btruotion, or interpretati~n, 
which represents the activity of thought. 
Of course, percepti0n has mere than just an aesthetic quality, for it 
is by perceiving that we gain information about our world. According 
to Lewis, seeing is a form of knowledge or a cognitive experience and so 
we must distinguish a given aia.d an interpretive element in seeing. Em-
pirical knowledge and perception b0th contain theae same twp elements. 
It is important in understanding Lewis' theory of perception to 
see that it is not only empirical knowledge that c~ntains a sensory ele-
ment and an interpretive element, but that seeing also contains both 
these elementso If Lewis was claiming o'ly that empirical knowledge 
contained a given and an interpretation of that given, then this would 
pe~~aps simply mean that upon seeing the same object, e~g., a tree, due 
to a difference of interest, we might classify it differentlyo If this 
was what Lewis meant, we would n©t see the tree differently, but simply 
because of our interest, use a different classification scheme for iden-
tifying ito 
Lewis is maintaining more thaE. this. For Lewis to give an account 
of the nature 0f knowledge, it is necessary for him to analyze basic 
facts such as seeing a tree. According to Lewis, it is only when we 
have no philosophical problems that we can aff erd to let such things as 
'seeing a tree' go unanalyzed. In his theory ef knowledge every cogni-
tive experience, including the experience of seeing a tree, is analyzed 
into the tw0 elementso An adequate theory of perception must, of 
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c0urse, account for the fact that we do see trees rather tham just lime$ 
and color patches. If Le~is simply meant that we interpret what we see 
differently and this shows the activity of the min~ in knowledge, then 
he would claim that what we interpret is what we see, e.g., houses, 
people, trees, etco But it is not the case that we simply interpret 
these objects that we see, but rather, in seeing we interpret the ele-
ments of the giveno So it is not just that we interpret what we see 
but that in seefng there is interpretingo 
I have mentioned that according to Lewis an adequate theory of per-
ception will be able to acceunt for the fact that we see such things as 
trees,·h0uses, etco, and also provide grounds for the distinction be-
tween v~ridical an.d illus0ry perceptien. Another fact that the©ries of 
perception are required to account for is that we sometimes see the 
same thing differentlyo Howeven the fact that people sometimes see 
things.differently plays a mere important role in Lewis' theory than 
this •. · Situ~tions in which we w0uld empJoy 'seeing as' are ueed to il-
lustrate both the elements in seeingo 
I 
The example Lewie considers to facilitate our understanding ot the 
interpretive in seeing im an adult seeing am. object a.s a. fountain pen, 
while a child sees it as a plaything. It is not simply that the child 
and\ the adult interpret what they eee diffeirently, but that,th'ey see 
the object differently. The fact that peeple see the feuntair.t pen dif-
ferently reveals that the mind plays a rele in seeing, and Lewis has 
called·this role "interpreting." 
To make it clear that an analysis ef seeing involves an element 
ether than this interpretive element, Lewis points out that peeple can-
net see the fountain pen as just anything. For example, one cannot see 
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a foUl!ltai• pen as aoft, er as paper, er as a cubicalo3 So there is am 
element invelved ia seeing which the mind calU!J.et alter: this unalter-
able elemen.t is 'the HllHry eleme:at in seei•g an.d called the 'givea." 
Hence from the fact that pe•ple with differen.t back:greun.ds weuld give 
differemt a:m.swers te the queatie:n, "What de yeu see when. you see 
this? 114-- it is cc.n1cluded that seeing am object i11 i:aterpretimg the 
giveno 
In order to illustrate some of the philosophical problems which 
develop in this theery ef percepti•n, we meed a mere cemplete acceunt 
~f Lewis' analysis ef 'seei•g'o This can be provided by further char-
acterizing what Lewis means by the 'given' and the 'interpretive ele-
ments' in 1 seeimg 1 o 
According te Lewis, the child and the oyster epen their eyes te a 
buzzing,_ bleomiBg werld ef chaes$ This buzzi:ag, bloomiag werld is a 
"stream ef co:n.sci0usn.ess"5 and as such is the abselute given because 
thie is unalterable by milld. This stream of censcieusness is differen-
tiated, and so the human mind can. break up the stream into elementso 
These elements which are unique eccurrem.ces are called "presen.tatiom.s." 
Each presem.tati0m is a unique @ccurremce, but it is qualitatively idem-
tical te ether presentations. 
Lewis believem it is essential that presemtatiens are disti•gu.ish-
ed frem the properties ef objectso A differe~ce between presentatiens 
aJ!.d properties is that types @f preseatatiems er quale have n0 •ameso 
We en eccasion do refer te the presemtati0ns with a se~tence such as, 
"This leeks redo" Hewever, Lewis is careful to note that when "this" 
refers te a type ,f presentati~m, this sentence has a different, mean~•g 
than the cemmon times when 'this' refers to the property ef an object. 
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When'this' refers te the presentatiens, there is met any actual pr~di-
catie:n., because the subject ud predicate cei11cideo "This leeks red" 
weuld m~u the same as the eja.culati•• "red leekf 11 6 OJI. the ether ham.d, 
we say an object leeks red, when o• leeking at it, we have presemta-
tiems that a.~e qualitatively identical to the ••es we have whe• we leok 
at a really red object under the preper ceaditiems. Se te say all ob-
ject;is red means, ame:ag other thi:ags, that if I see it under preper 
' ! 
illumination, I will see it as redo 
Am.ether way ef noti:ag this diff eren.ce b~twee• the prese•tatiens 
am.d preperties ef ~b·jects is th:.at the preperties ef ebject11 may ·be see:a 
in different ways. The rt11u.ndlo.ess ef a penny may be seem as ellipti~al 
er a red object may be see• as a differe11t celor under different illum-
i:natien.o 
According to Lewis, a.my time we apply a name, we are making a pre-
di"ctiolll abeut Gur f.uture experienceo I:m. the example abeve, by _calling 
the object red, we predicted that we weuld see it as red umder the pro-
per cenditisns. These predictions can. be put in the form of hypetheti-
cals; aJtd there weuld be a great many ef them mea•t by each werdo 
"This is red" mens, "If e:n.e sees it u:m.der standard illumin.atie•, t11J1.e 
will see it as red," "If one sees it ill blue light, it will look pur-
ple," etco The application of a.name which. is the predictioll 11f fu-
ture experience is the interpretive elemento Te apply a name, which is 
te make~ &Ill ide:ati:f'icaticua, is te ill.terpret. ,If the hypetheticals are 
true, t·hen the applicatien of the name was cerrect. T• sum up, we re-
ceive presemtatiems amd using these presentations a.s a clue te eur fu-
ture experience, we iaterpret what the object iso Our imterpretatien 
is cerrect if the li•t ef hypothetical• meut by this i».terpretatien i111 
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verifiedo An example will make this clear. 
For an. example, I shall analyze seeiag a foUJ1.tai11 pen accordi•g to 
Lewis' theory of perceptio•o With the normal backgroWl.d a...d desires of 
a graduate studemt wan.ti•g to write, I search the top of my de&ko Sud-
dealy I have a quite particular visual presentatio• -- it is the kimd I 
.. 
roughly refer to as a gray, cylindrical presentation - gray, cylin.dri-
cal look! I might iaterpret the preseatation as the object looking 
gray ud cylin.dricalo This would meu, "If I look at that object a.gai111 
uder these comditions, it will look gray an.d cyliadrical"; "If I 
chaage the illumi•ation. in. certain ways, it will •ot look gray"; "If I 
chruage the a.n.gle from which I view the object, it will aot look cylia-
drical," etco However, because I do 11eed to get my thesis written, I 
might interpret the 'gray, cylindrical' presentations as a fou.tain. pemo 
If I make this interpretatioa of the prese•tatioas, them I see a foun.-
tai:n pen.o In.terpretimg the prese•tatio1u11 as a fountain pen meus, "If 
I hold it in the correct positioa, it will mark olil. the paper"; "If I 
hand it to someome wuting a fou:atailll pen., it will satisfy him"; "If I 
hold it, it will not melt in. my hudso" This list goes on ud on, but 
Lewis tells us that we need •ot be embarrassed at not being able to 
think of this complete list evea tho~h it is simply what we mean whea. 
we call an object a fountain pen, because we usually are ig'l'loraat of 
the complete comcepto If all these hypothetical statements are verifi-
, 
ed, then I do see a foW1tain peno But since they oaniot be completely 
tested, it is more accurate to say, "I &ee it as a fountai• pen" rather 
tha.Jl "I see a fountain pelll.o 11 ' 
I have thus far provided a.JI. accowtt of Lewis' a.J1.alysis of seei~. 
I 
This an.alysis resulted from looking at a 1oase i• which it was suggested 
l 
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that two persons with differe•t backgrounds would see something differ-
entlyo The example from which Lewis develops his a•alysis of 'seei•g' 
is a case in which we would use the 'seei:mg as' locutiom rather thaa 
'aeei:ng 1 o His example of a child seeiJlg' the fou:ata.i:a pen as a play-
thing is similar to Wittge•stein 1 s example of childrea seeing the chest 
as a playhouseo 
This point is esse:atial in UAderstandiag the colUlection betwee• 
Wittgensteim 1 s comments dealimg with 1 seei:ag as' aJ1.d Lewis' position 
which does not seem om the surface to be concerned with the logic of 
'seeing as' expressions~ In Lewis' analysis of 'seeing', he thi».ks of 
cases in which people looki•g at the same object see it differently, 
and these are imstanpes in which we ordi~arily use the 'seeing as' lo-
cutiono Using these i~stances as illustrations, he says 'seeing' is 
composed of am i•terpretive and a give• elememto 
I L ~ I 
We have seem that Lewis 1 ,aJta~ys~s 1 of 'perception' imto prese•ta-
j • I I l 
tions amd interpretation results from his attempt to accoUllt for not 
' ' 
only veridical perception but also illusions and situatio:as ia which 
people see thiags differentlyo We cam now turn our attention to an. ex-
amination of 1presentation 1 a.n.d then, 'interpretation' in order to see 
if these make sense in an accowtt of veridical perception, illusions, 
and 'seeing asu imstanceso 
kl. interesti•g characteristic of presemtatio•s, according to Lewis, 
is that we cam never know if an.other person has presentations qualita-
tively similar to our own. whe:n we both say we see ·the same objecto 
As between. different miitds, the assumptioll that 
a concept which is common is correlated.with sen-
sory con.teats-which are qualitativfdy identical, 
is to a.JI. extent verifiably false, is implausible 
to a further extemt, amd in the nature of the 
case Cal\ never be verified as holding even. when 
it may reasomably be presumedo 7 
This leads to a philosophical puzzle th~t might be stated i• the 
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followi•g question: how do I kmow that when I see a red triamgle, I am 
seeiJJ.g it like what you see when you see a red triangle? Or how do I 
kaow I have the qualitatively identical visual presemtations whem I see 
a red triangle as you have whem you see a red triangle? As the above 
quote would indicate, Lewis' answer is that we could m.ever bowo It is 
like if I could see the red tria.agle the way you see it or 'through 
your eyes', perhaps I wo~ld call it a purple hexagono Of course, we 
all call the object a r~d triangle because we were taught a commom. lam.-
guage, but each perso~'s presentation of a red triangle might be dif-
feren.to 
Suppose it should be a fact that I get the se:ia.-
eatioa you s.igna.lize by 2ayi:mg 'red' whenever 
I look at what you call 'green' an.d vice versa. 
oooWe could ~ever discover then so lomg as they 
did mot impair thepgw:er to discriminate and 
relate as others do~ - , 
Of course. this problem earmot be resolved by each person drawing all 
exact representation of his visual impressiono If upon lookiag at a 
red tri~n.gley your visual impression. was actually the same kind as the 
on.e Iiha.ve-when seeing a purple hexago11.~ you would simply draw the pie-
ture that resulted in your having a purple hexagon preseatation which 
would.be a red tria.Jtgleo9 According to Lewisy every word has both a 
social"mealling and a private meam.img 9 a.ad the private meaning is the 
p_'reaemtatio11 ima.g~ryo The private meaning or the deltotation of a com.-
cept to an individual mind is the presentations th.at a;erve as clues for 
the application of the concepte It doesn't matter what the private 
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meaning is as lo•g as we Ca.l'l. co•sisteatly commUllicate with other peopleo 
In.deed Lewis' chapter Oll "The Pure Concept" is aimply about this idea 
of a common mea~ing that transcends each of our own imagerieso rt 
seems as if much of the work Lewis does in ~ ~ !!!! World Order is 
an attempt to explain how there ca:p be so much agreement despite the 
pas.aibility of complete discrepancies in basic visual presentationso 
ooothat this 1 COIDmOll. reality' is precisely Olte 
of the thi:mgs whic_,h needs to be accoumted for, 
in the face of the fact that we ca:rmot reason-
ably suppose that presented or immediate exper-
ience is actually commo:m to the degree that 
reality is 0 10 
So our presentations never make al'l.y differe•ce to our knowledge or com-
mun.icationo As long as we both call the same thing red, then it makes 
mo difference whether I have qualitatively similar presentationso 
Hence the fact that we can •ever know whether others have similar or 
different presentations than we do whe:m. we see the sa~e o~,ject is not 
importanto 
However, it is essemtial to Lewis' position that we are able to 
I 
recognize the presentationso In order to make iaterpretations we· mumt 
recognize the current presentatio:ms as qualitatively similar to former 
o:Res that Iinterpretedo For exa1*ple, in order to see the fountain. pen, 
I must recognize that I have the presentations that I have previously 
had in ca.see i111.which I· interpreted what I saw as a fou:mtain peno 
Le'\iii.s states that we cannot have knowledge of the presentations 
because there is no possibility of making' an error with the presenta-
tionsa °Kn0wledgeis the opposite of errqf and mistake, so where thes4' 
are not possible, it would not be possible to have knowledge~ Know-
ledge .implies verification 9 and presentations do •ot have the temporal 
span necessary for verification that properties of objects haveo So 
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verification also makes no sense i• co:nn.ection with presemtationo That 
there can be mo knowledge of presentatiom is a result of Lewis' fUllJ.d.a-
mental doctrine that all kn.owled.ge has the two elements -- the·i•ter-
pretive and the givene However, it should be pointed out that for the 
,, 
same reason. L,ewis ull.derstood tha;t we should not say "we have kJJ.owledge 
, , 
of the presentatio:ns 9 "1we also cam.mot say "we recognize themo 11 
Lewis' problem of different people havimg different presentat~ons 
even, thdll#h they see the same object is more serious than Lewis reveals. 
It is not just that oae does not know if others have qualitatively sim-
ilar preseatatioms when they see the same object, for how does one kllow 
othe~s;h.ave any presentatiolls at a.11? If there is 1110 reason to believe 
they:;ha.veq:ualitatively similar p:re1e•tations, is there any reason to 
' . ' ; , 
believeFtlaa.y ha've any presentation$ at all? We do say others see, a.n.d 
'see i meam.&1 · .i i:n.terpreti•g presentatio:m.s' so, if they see, they have 
. I 
' ' 
presemtatiomso But if .this is what 'seeimg' mes.ks, them how do we 
know others,'ca.n: seeo We laQ.ow they react to objecta as we do by sayin.g 
thin.gs· such as'.: 11I. see a fountain. pell 9 " but seeing is more tha.Jl this, 
sincer·i'lnis· b.terpreting prese:atationso It is obvious that,. accordi11g 
to Lewis, if we say of someoae that he seem, then we cannot claim he 
doe111n. 1 t,hav:eany prese:ntatio•s, but how do we k:Bow to say he seeso Re-
memberilllg'that eachper11ol'l identifies what 'given' refers to in his ex-
periemce; wAat if someone could mot fi•d anything in his visual exper-
ie:ace~to~ea]f·l··tl'le 'givem'o Should he quit lilaying he can see or can he 
just ~,a;1u1ume that , v gi ve:n v ilil there? 
It would seem that we have no more reason to believe that others 
have a.aypreae:nta.tions tha.Jl we do to say they have similar ones, ud if 
1 seeinr,- 1 me::tns 1 interpreti1ag presentations', then we would llot k:mow if 
27 
others actually could 'see' ud hence be in the rather awkward porltiOll 
of sclipsismo Lewis lil.as the poHi bili ty of avoiding 110] ips'ism with an 
a.l'lalogical argwnen\ but he does not use this for qualitatively similar 
presenta.tionso Since all knowledge of objects is probable, perhaps it 
would not bother Lewis that the probability that others see is compound-
ad a.Jaother \.tcimeo · 
L:et:us re-ei:amime the way Lewis in.troduced presentations and i:ater-
preta"trion. i:a cases of 1 seei~;asv and how this accounts for illusioll.o 
The giveJ1.1,wa1L illustrated as explai:rai•g why we could see a fou.taia pem 
as a o;yli:ader O-li'·a• a.good buy but not as spft. The fact that we could 
mot ses.,a fou:atain pen aa a moft object indicated that there was some-
thi:m.g;i:n·ourcvisual experience that was not alterable by th.e mindo The 
fact that :.we col:lld• aee the fountai:n pell differem.tly and differe:at from 
I I 
the ill.fa.at ·wasr explaimed as indicating the interpretive element ill see-
in.go If.we Ca.lUlot kJlow if others have qualitatively similar preaenta ... 
tiolil.Br d;hen 1we• do n.ot have a reason for introducing the idea of an i:n-
terpreti~e elememto Of course the locution 'seeing it as' does indicate 
that there'is·an 'it' that is ill common when Lewis sees 'it' as a foun-
ta.in pen and the·infruat sees 'it' as a playthingo But of course.this 
Vit' is·Jtot·a p:resentatio•; 1 itn is the fowatain pen.o Amd if someo:ne 
argued that iit 1 is:m't a foua.taiR pen. to the infant or that 'fowitain. 
pe11 1 was .. just Lewi11' i:m.terpretation of 'it', we could at least pick 
'it' 12.p'a.nd,throw ~it' at them, and you ca.n. 1 t throw presentatio:as 
aroumd.the roomo Unless we can. assume that the presen.tatio:n11 are simi-
lar 9 then there seems mo reason to consider these illustratioas of in-
terpretations., Lewis says that we ca.n presume that in a "broad se:mse" 
the presentations are 1 qualitativaly no differento 1111 But not beimg 
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told what this "!Jroad sense" is, this is mot of any help. 
I 
The same that has been said here about cases of 'seeing as' can be 
said about illusio~s. Lewis' explanation of illusions is that we get 
the same presentatioms as others that make a correct interpretation 
a.md so have veridical perception, but we make a different interpreta-
tion B.lil.d this interpretation is wrong 9 since it results in predictions 
that are probably false. But mow we fiad out that we cam't laiow and 
l. 
that it doesn1t matter if we have similar presentations as others have. 
So illusioms cannot be accouated for by our having the same presemta-
tions, y~t a different iaterpretatiom than. others have,aince it can 
never be known what presentatioms we have. All that can be lalown. is 
what 'interpretation.' a perso11 makes. It is begin.lli:itg to seem th(l!.t the 
prese1rtation1Ldon 1 t really matter alld that all that really matters is 
that Lroake a.u:iorir'eot or incorrect imterpretatio•. 
ierha.ps>the presentations play a role we have not :=.oted yet, and 
this m±g:nt,:;be: revealed by lookb.g at the case that illustrated th~ gi-
. ...! 
vel!l. dlfi;:,we eaiu:never bow if others have simi+ar preseimtatio:ns, does 
the faott that we oan. 1:.t see the foull.ta.in pell all!' soft illustrate the gi-
ve:n? .:LewiiLcould simply meaJa that: you can.not apprehend the presenta-
tio11s you.mormally· il!lterpret as sqf"\i while seeing the fountaim peBo It 
is notcthat·you·ca.uot apprehelld the presentations I interpret as soft, 
but tha.t·you ca•~t apprehe111d the o•es you iaterpret as softo But is 
this true? : 'Ph±s would mean that. seeing a fountain pen could not be 
ruaalyzed> :t:mto ,the::eleme:n~s apprehen.di:ng the prese:mti:itio:ms you normally 
interpret as soft an.d interpretim.g this as a fouu.tai:n peno But al-
though it may be the case that we usually do mot appreh~md the presen-
tati.ol!ls· we· mormally · b1terpret as soft while seeimg the foUllltain. pen, 
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there is mo reason why ~his is impossible, and as long as we imterpret 
these as a fountai~ pen, them we are seeimg a fountain pen. 
' 
It would' seem that Lewis' point im illustratimg the given by am 
instance such as not being able to see a fountain pen as soft means no 
matter what presentations you have 7 don't interpret it as soft. This 
is of course true for the ~alysis of seeing a fountain pen, because 
whatever presentatioms you have, if you interpret them as soft, then 
you are having an illusiono It would seem that ~e~is' point here has 
to be that whatever presentations you have~ don't call them soft. But 
then this is just to say whatever happens you will be wrong if you say 
you can see this fountain pen as soft and this tells us nothing about 
any unalterable abstraction of seeingo If anything turns out to be un-
alterable here, it is the language. 
So whatever presemtations we have, if we make the correct inter-
pretation 7 then we do see that object; if we make an incorrect interpre-
tation, then we are having an illusiono So having presentations seems 
to be an unnecessary element to seeingo An.d of course if presentations 
play no role in seeing, then there is nothing to interpret and so there 
could not be an interpretive element in seeiRgo 
The fact that presentations are simply an assertiom and can ac-
count for none of the above cases is also seen by looking at the way we 
are to recognize these presemtationso I shall examine what Lewis says 
about the recognition of the presentationso "It may be said that the 
recognition of the quale is a judgment of the type 7 1 This is the same 
ineffable 0yellow 1 that I saw yesterday 1 0 1112 One of Lewis' points is 
that tkis use of 1 jud.gme•t' in this sentence would be a diffe~ent sense 
of 'judgment' than normal for reasons similar to those he gave for not 
30 
using 'knowledge' in connection with presentationso The quoted sentence 
contains not only a different sense of 'judgment', but we need to over-
look his use of 1 see 1 here because of course he would mot want to say 
we 'see' the prese•tatio•sa He calUlot of course say we 'see' the pre-
sentations because as indicated earlier 7 the criterio~ of an adequate 
theory of perception is that it accoUJlts for the fact that we see ob-
' jects such as treesa Also as I .have indicated elsewhere, seeimg is a 
form of lalowledge~ and there can. be no knowledge: of t_he presemtationso 
Knowledge always goes beyond the presentations with an interpretatioao 
So it is wromg to say that we 11see 1 the prese:atationso Al1110 note that 
Lewis has to put 'yellow' in quotes to imdicate that this word is nor-
mally used to refer to a property of objects and mot as it here does to 
the presentatioms one interprets as yellowo So we could rephrase the 
sentence as, "These presentations are qualitatively similar to presenta-
tions I apprehended yesterday amd interpreted as yellowa" 
However the importance of Lewis' discussion here is to point out 
that there is an immediate comparison of the give:m. with a memor~ image, 
but this comparison. "is immediate 'and i:n~ubi table; verificati<;>n would 
h . . th t t . t " 13 ave no meaning wi · respec o i a This direct comparison is not a 
normal use of memory because normally when we remember, ome of the ob-
jects of comparison is "in objective realityo" In this case, both the 
memory image and the quale are subjectivea 
Remember we are considerin.g Lewis' recognition or identification 
of presemtations by comparing them to tae memory image of former pre~ 
sentationso But if the current presentations do compare with the me-
mory image,, them.' in the same circumsta111.ces we will d.nterpret these pre-
sentation.s,a.is we did the formero But si:n.ce the illterpretatio11 and the 
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presentations are abstract elements im our seeimg experience, the re-
sult will be that I will see,the sam~ thing this time as I did the time 
I apprehended the presentations I am rememberingo Or without going too 
far from Lewisp we could say the result of this recognition by compari-
son will be th~t I will see the object as the sa~e thing I saw before. 
Ome might remember that accordi:gg to Lewisj at the point at which we 
are interpretiRg the presemtatiom? s~mce we have not checked any of the 
hypo~hetical s~atemente that will confirm.this i•terpretatiom, we have 
no reaso:m to thimk; that this is an illusion rather tham perceptiollo 
So, saying 1 1 see it as' j which does not imply what the object aciually 
is the ~ay 1 see 1 does? would seem desi?ableo 
Lewis realizes that this is mot the sense of 'comparison' that we 
might use im an instamce such as idemtifyillg a criminal by comparing 
his face to the o•e in th~ photograph of a wanted postero But if it is 
'i 
not this seillse of ~comparison', what semse is it? Lewis acts as if 
there is amother semse but does not tell us what it iso Wittgenstei• 
makes us aware of the w~y 'seeing as' can. lead us to thimk of a 'com-
parisonu ~=v 1 oooit is as if all image came into comtactj and for a time 
remaimed iR contactp with the visual impressio~o 111 4 Or we might say 
the comparisom is something like the presentation coinciding with the 
memory imageo It is almost that we look through our memory image onto 
the presentatiom and if things aligl'l, tken we see the object as a foUll-
tain peno This perhaps gives us a picture of the idea of a comparison 
between presentatioms amd memory imagesj but it does not give a sense 
for t;llis use of ucompa.riso:m. 1 o As Wittge•stein. says, although '.seeing 
, 1 
asu is :ttot a comparisom? it 11 artro•gly suggests" that it iso 
And in this way 1 seeing dashes as a face' does 
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not in.valve- a comparisoD. betwe-ell a group of 
dashes an.d a real human face; and, o• the other 
ham.d, this form of expression. most Edro:ag~y 15 
suggests that we are al,ludiag to a compar1somo 
A comparison which makes mo seRse to verify could amount to no 
more than just saying the~e seem to me to be similar, and what seems to 
be,would then be the caseo Lewis would be sayiag if your present pre-
sentations seem to you to be similar to your memory image of former 
presemtatio~s, then they areo This is very co~trary to Lewis' former 
defim:iddon. of presentatio:m.e as the unal terableo It is not that whe:m. it 
is meanim.gless to talk of verification, then on.e cauot be mistakem, 
btlt rather that here it makes mo sense to talk of making mistakes or of 
getti:1.g,Q:t right;;; 
S:i:11.ce.·r.Lewis .was usimg 1 seeing as' il'l.stamces to illustrate the ele-
mel\ts :li:m.; seeing, we cam. understand why he might think that 'seei:mg' was 
the r111sult of.a. comparisono Although 1 seein.g it as a fountain pem 
while l!lomeo:ne; elsfiL.sees it as a playthimg 0 does suggest there is all 
0 it 1 ill!J.oommoR. im. these two cases a•d the difference is im one case 
vit 1 matches with the memory image of a fountain pell and another time 
with the'·memory image of a playthin.gj this matchim.g or comparing makes 
mo aiemse6c It·does :aot make sense because verificatio:n has no meaning 
in coll\.aection witl! it o It is not that there is l!lo verification, but 
that ~vert:fioatione has ~o meaJJ.i:m.g im co•:nectiolil with this 'comparisom 1 o 
hd if' 1verificatio:a v has iao mlilalti:ng ~ then 11 correct comparisom." has no 
~ 
mea:nillg; >".hd if'~,it doesn 1,t make sense to talk about a "correct compar-
i~o:a" ~ ::thlilllF how, could it make sem.~e to talk about a 0 comparison 1 ? , · 
I' 
We can understand how poimtless the idlilal of 'recognition' or 
ucomparisonu is here by notici:ng that it simply doesn't matter what we 
compare"orhow the comparison comes out or that we compare, just as 
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long as we say "I see a fou.Rtain pen" at the appropriate timeo Witt-
genstein helps us to see how senseless this notion of a 1 comparisom 1 
here iso He states: 
Always get rid of ~he private object in this way: 
assume that it constantly changes, but that you 
do not notice the chaRg.e because your memory con,.. 
stantly'deceives youo 15 
To apply this to Lewis' situation of comparing his present presenta-
, 
tion with the memory image of former ones in order to give an interpre-
tatiom of it and so see it as a fo~n~a~n pen, we might get the memory 
image of presentations interpreted as follll.tain pens changing to say me-
mory images of presentations interpreted as sticks, but we forget that 
this is the memory image of a ll!tick and so still say, "I see it as a 
fountain peRo 11 He:r;e we see that this comparison is just empty theory, 
.for it is surely sen,seless to talk of comparison where it does not mat-
ter what we comparee According to Lewis' allalysis, such a situation as 
I have described above would have to involve this comparison, since ac-
cording to Lewis' analysis it would be a case of 1 seeimg a fou•taiR 
penuo But if a similar situation happened with our identification of 
the criminal by comparing his face to the o~e in the photograph, we 
would laugh at the idea of a comparison hereo That is, if instead of 
the photograph on the poster, we looked at the portrait of Lincoln on 
the five dollar bill and then pointed to a wanted criminal aiad said, 
''That is the wanted criminal~" we could not explain this by saying we 
compared him to the portrait on the dollar billo Whatever we did, it 
certaiRly wasn 9 t a case of comparisono 
Interpreting 
Another problem Lewis 1 aRalysis of 1 seeing 1 creates is that we can 
1. 
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never klllow aay empirical fact with more than a high degree of probabil-
l 
Lewis is of course fully aware that according to his theory of 
I 
klllowled.ge, we can never have more thaw. probabilitylin our knowledge of 
objects. He believes this is mot a defect in his theory, but rather it 
is simply the case that we Call aever obtain certainty in regard to ob-
ject&o We should feel the absurdity im Lewis' claim which would, for 
example, meam that he knows with a high degree of probability, or it is 
highly probable, that the object he has bee• writing his book with and 
occasiomally staring at is a fou:m.taim peno Accordiag to Lewis, 'foum.-
taim pen' meaRS a list of hypothetical statements so long I could never 
completely verify themo We cumot completely verify this list, so we 
~re barred from certaimtyo We ~r• limited to reaching higher aad high-
er degrees of probability as we verify more and more of the statements 
om our list .. 
W:h.a.t we mean by 'fouatain pen' is "If I hold it in a certaiJl posi- · 
tio:n, it will write"; "If I smash it im. my pocket, it will staiR my 
l 
clothes "; "If I use it for a long period of time, it will run. out of 
ink," etco So in order to kn.ow if we actually saw a foUJ1.taim. pell or 
$imply experi~mc~d am illusion of ome, we mu~t verify this complete 
listo The list is impossible to completely verify, so we have to real~ 
I ' 
ize that we can omly have probable klllowledge of physical objectso We 
are balUled from having certainty because the list of hypothetical state 
me:mts ·is., t.oo long a•d if one of the um.tested statements would prove 
; 
::f'all!lef'' then we would be wrong that we saw a fountain pen -- we o:&tly had 
If,· this is what fountain pell meams, then with Lewis' theory of 
peroeptibJS.7 we ca.mtot even have ·probable knowledge ta.at we see a foun-. 
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tain pen.o Probable knowledge would be the result of verifying some of 
the statements but not all of themo As we verified more and more of 
the statements, we would gain higher and higher degrees of probability. 
But for the same reason we cannot verify that we see a fountain pen, we 
cannot verify any statement on this listo For example, if one member 
of the list of hypothetical statements for the meaning of fountain pen 
is "If I hold this object in such-and-such a position, it will write on. 
the paper," I could never actually see the writing on the paper but 
only interpret my presentations as writingo Interpreting my presemta-
tions as writing would meaa that I predict a list of hypotheticals 
could be verifiedo So in trying to verify one of the hypotheticals 
predicted of the presentations I interpreted as a fountain. pen, I would 
simply get another list of hypotheticals needing verification and for 
each one on this list, another listo Since I could not verify any 
statement on this list, it is not that I can't have certainty about 
this object, but I·can 1 t even have any probabilityo If I could verify 
omeof the hypotheticals 9 then I would have probability, but I can't 
I 
verify any one hypotheticalo 
I. -
This is more serious than compounding probabilities because in or-
der for probability to make any semse, we would meed something like the 
number of true cases compared to the total number of case.a, and here we 
would simply not' baow aE.y true caseso As Wittgenstein says, it is as 
i'f' we toss a coin to settle a tosso For Lewis, it could, always look 
like ra1n 9 but never raino 
According to Lewis 9 seeing a foUJ:J.tain pen as a plaything is the 
result of an interpretationo Wittgenstein reminds us of some important 
differences between 'seeing as', 1 seeing 1 and 1 iRterpreting'o 17 Ala in-
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terpretation is like an hypothesis in that with either we seek evidence 
~o support our claimo There are circumstances in which we might inter-
.I. 
pret something to be a fountain pen, but Lewis is not considering such 
circumstanceso Perhaps when looking in a museum at common objects from 
another century, one might interpret an object as a fomatain peno How-
ever this is a very differe•t~circumstance than when Lewis is talking 
... ,_,..,~~· 
about the peR with which he is writing his booko In a• actual inter-
prating case we would expect the person to say, "This is supposed to 
be a foWltai:it pen," or perhaps he just goes on after a bit of hesita-
tiono In such cases we could ask him why he interpreted it as a foun-
tain peno He might mention clues that led him to that interpretation 
rather than another such as ink stains om the tipo He might try to 
prove to himself that he had correctly interpreted it as a fountain pen 
by holding it in such and such a position and seeing if it would write 
on ·papero 
This is all rather foreign to cases of 'seeing' amd 'seeing as 1 o 
If the child picks up the founta~m pen a.llld places it im his mouth and 
• 
puffs on it in imitation of his father, could we ask why h~ sees it as 
a cigar? If there is such a questionj it certainly is mot one askimg 
about evidence to support that way of seeing, but rather a questiom 
about the child 1 a backgroWldo "Why did you see a fountain pen?'.' is ob-
vious no:mse:mseo The times in which someone would say of youj "He sees 
the fountain pen" or "He sees it as a fountaim pen" are the cases in. 
which you do not go'om to test the objecto It ca:rm.ot be the case that 
all we are ever able to have is an inte~pretationo Imterpretations 
function. im contrast to cases in. ,"'fhich "it might be this wa;y" or ":i.t 
' might be that way,n "I need more evidence but I thi:nko•ot" "it must be 
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like this becauseooo 11 are out of placeo That is, ~l'l.terpretatio• fIDlc-
tioms ia coatrast to cases in which we just react ~where we don't pro-
ceed with cautiono 
So seeing a fountain pen is nothing like interpreting something as 
a foUAtaim peno We interpret somethiRg this way rather than another 
wayo One of the differences between 'seeing as' and 'seeiag' is that 
with 'seeing as' whoever says of himself or of another that they see 
something as somethimg else must be aware of the possibility that there 
are other ways that the object can be seemo Perhaps the person cannot 
see the duck-rabbit as a duck, but if he uses the expression,"I see it 
as a rabbit" rather than, "I see a rabbit~" them he at least knows that 
it can be seen in a different wayo So a characteristic of 'seeing as' 
is that there are alternatives~ as with imterpretations, there are oth-
er altermativeso So perhaps Lewis' assimilation of the concept 'seeing 
as' a.D.d the concept 1 s~eing 1 allowed him to think of 'seeimg' as the re-
sult of an interpretationo There is a d~ffere~ce in 'seeing as' and 
1 iRterpreting 1 in that imterpreting involves gathering information to 
show that one interpretation is superior to anothero Interpretations, 
like hypotheses~ are situations in which we verify our interpretationo 
With 'seeing as' there is no verificatio•o 
Although 'seeing as' and 'interpretation' are different, the ~imi­
larity im that they both involve alternatives amd the fact that Lewis 
confuses nseeimg as 0 with 1 seeing 0 , help us to umderstand why Lewis 
might think of nseeimg 0 as an interpretatioRo Perhaps slipping from 
1 seeimg 1 into 0 seeing as 0 amd ~hen slipping from 1 seeimg as' to. 'inter-
pretation °, ·allowed Lewis to th.ink 1 seeing' is an interpretatiollo 
As a final comment om Lewis' analysis of 0 seeing' into a presemta-
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tiom and am interpretive element, I would like to discuss the following 
passage: 
Here perhaps we· should like to reply: the des.-
cription of what is .got immediately, ioeo, of 
the visualexperie:nce, by mea:ms'of .an il1ter .... 
pret.atiom.--is am indirect description. 1 1 see 
the"figure as a box' means~ I have a p~r.ticu­
lar visual experie:ace which I have found that .I 
always.have. when I interpret the figure as a 
box or when I look at a boxo· But if it meant 
Jthis I ought to laiow ito I ought to. be able 
to refer to the experience directly 9 and not 
only indirectly (as I call speak ~Bred without 
calling it the colour of blood)o 
I 
I shall paraphrase a sentence from this passage in using Lewis' exam-
.I ' I 
ple and termso According to Lewis "I see the o~ject as a fountain pen" 
means "I have the particular prese:mtatio:as I have f ou:itd I always have 
when I probably correctly interpret the presentations as a fountain 
pe:ao" A criticism Wittgenstein makes that is releva:1tt to our discussion 
is if it makes sense to talk about interpreting our presemtations, it 
ought to ~ake sense to talk about them without an interpretation, ioeo, 
we ought to be able to refer as directly to a presentation as we can to 
redo With a color I can call a color the color of blood or refer to it 
as 0 red 0 o So it seems with presentations I should be able to interpret 
one as the presentatiom of a 'foun.tain pen or refer to it with a nameo 
But Lewis e:x:plici tly states that the presentations ca.1uiot be .meaning-
fully na.medo 19 .. If it doesn°t make sense to give presentatioms a name, 
does it make sense to say~"This is a presentation of a fountain pen"? 
The demo:iasctrative 0 thi!il 1 serves to remi:ad us of criteria we have already 
adopted~ :not to give us a new cititeriomo 
We cam see this point clearly with an example like looking at a 
flower:on a.;nature walk and the guide begins by saying, "This species 
is found in the damp u.n.dergro!'thooo 11 and we interrupt with the question 
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"What species did you say the flower, was?" Normally he would give ua a 
name a111.d tell us how to reco~ize, it., But what if his reply was that 
'this species' had Ro na~e and there is no way to recognize it. We 
-l .J 
would be very puzzled and might wonder why he 1started his talk at this 
point on the walko In. i;hia case the use of 'this' would be senseless 
' as·it is in connection with presentations which it makes no sense to re-
cognize and so to nameo 
If it made sense to recognize something, then it would make sense 
to give this a name and it would make sense to refer to it with the de-
monstrative 1 this 1 0 But none of these make sense in connection with 
presemtationso If it makes no semse to talk about 'recognizi:mg presen-
tc:i.tio:ms 1 ,what point is there ~lll. analyzing ,' s.eeimg' into 'presentations' 
I ),• J· 
and 'interpretations'~ 
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CHAPTER III 
"ALL SEEING IS SEEING AS" 
I:n his article "Seeing a.l'ild Seeing As" Vesey states, "All seeing is 
1 
seeing aso" This is a very unusual statement. This statement plays 
a very important role in Vesey's theory of perception, and he restates 
it several timeso Do we understand what this sentence means? We are 
familiar with the expression 'seeing as 1 o That is, we understand its 
I 
use i:n such expressions as "Now I am seeing the reversible figure as a 
staircase.," We also are familiar with the use in "He is seeing tb.e ink 
blot as an orga.m. playero" We can think of numerous examples of 'see-
ing as', but do we understand Vesey's statement? 
If we do understand Vesey's statement, then we would know why "No 
seeing is seeimg as" and "Some seeing is seeing as" are false. That is, 
if we knew what Vesey's statement meant and thought it was true, then 
we would kriow why these were falseo I am wondering if we even under-
stand the stateme~to 
If "a.11 seeing is seeing as, 11 then seeing a fork is seeing a fork 
2 
as a forko Do I know what this means? That is, when would I use this 
expression? If someone at the dinner table asks me if I saw a fork as 
a foFk, would I know how to answer? Would I know what to do to find 
the an~~er? I would kmow how to amswer, if he asked me if I saw a re-
versible figure as a staircaseo 
We cannot think we understand what Vesey is saying in this context 
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simply because he uses words with which we are familiar. Vesey must 
explain to us what this statement means. Since people do not normally 
give a statement extra meanings, we1might woi.nder why he gives this part-
' ' 
icular statement some special meaning. 
.. 
V~sey provides three different 
explanations of what the statement means. This chapter will be devoted 
to a discussion of these three proposed meanings of "All seeing is see-
ing as." 
Used to Mark a Sel.f-Cont;r-adict.ion 
The first time he says, "I will mark my non-acceptance of these 
meanings for 'not see it as anything' by saying 'All seeing is see.ing 
· as 1 • 113 By his non-acceptance of the meanings he accepts "I saw it, but 
I didn't see it as anything" as self-contradictoryo So since "All seeing 
is seeing as" is to mark a statement as self-contradictory, the sentence 
c~nnot be an empirical generalizationo Although the sentence appears to 
be a generalization, it is obvious from his arguments that it is a dif-
ferent kind of sentence than "All politicians are dishonesto" So it 
would perhaps be less misleading to rephrase the statement "All seeing 
is seeing as" as " 1 Seeing' means 1 seeing as',." 
The discussion in the introduction on the difference between the 
concepiuP ':see:i:ng'' and 1 seeing as 1 makes it clear that 'seeing' does not 
mean 1 seeing as 1 '• That discussion reminded uip of the fact that we can 
describe what we see by making an exact copy, but an exact copy will·not 
be an •adequa.te::·description ,of what we see a thing as. Another fact 
which,, convinced us of the difference in these concepts was that the re-
port ''l··see ··a duck" is false, if there is not a duck present, but I can 
~ anramb±gu.ous figure .!!! a duck. 
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Another point in realizing that all •seeing' could not be 'seeing 
as' is made by Charles E. Burlingameo4 If "All seeing is seeing as," 
then when I see the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, it is true that I see the 
duck-rabbito I could not see the duck-rabbit as a duck without seeing 
l. 
the duck-rabbito But if "All seeing is seeing as," then I must have 
seen something else as a duck-rabbit, and seen something else as that 
something that I saw as a duck-rabbit that I saw as a duck. What could 
all these somethings be? You might try to say I saw the figure as a 
duck-rabbit and the lines as a figureo But the.n what is the something 
you saw as the lines? If "All seeing is seeing ali," we would be in-
volved in this regress. If Vesey meant by his statement, "All seeing 
is seeing as" that" 'Seeing' means 'seeing as'," taen it is falseo 
But perhaps we have been too hasty in thinking we understood Vesey's 
claim, for he is not the only philosopher5 to have explicitly claimed 
thiso 
True and False.Perc9ption 
Vesey states: "Another way of expressing the point that all see-
' ing is seeing as is to say that perceptions, like judgments, are either 
6 true or falseo" The claim that there are true and false perceptions 
rnay not seem to be very helpful in understanding "All seeing is seeing 
a,s." It is not obvious what would b'e meant by a true or false percep-
tion or why ''All seeing is seeing as" expresses this o In hopes of un-
derstanding what Vesey means by "All seeing is seeing as," I shall de-
velop his reasons for saying perceptions are true or false. 
It is an objective of Vesey's to show th.at perception does not in-
valve judgme:nto Previous theories in their attempts to explain cases 
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in which things look different than they are have considered these mis-
I\ 
takeso Never questioning the dogma that mistakes are the result of 
judgments, the theories result in the analysis of perception as involv-
ing judgmento Earlier theories of perception are committed to t~e tol-
lowing line of argumento 
Things sometimes look different than they areo 
These cases could he called mistaken perc.eptionso 
A mistake is the drawing of a false conclusion 
from evidenceo 
This drawing of a false conclusion.is a judgmenta 
Therefore perception involves judgmento 
Vesey understands previous theories of perception as agreeing that 
perception involves judgments but disagreeing on what they think the 
\. 
judgment is abouto There seem to be two possibilities hereo Either 
the judgment is about material things or the judgment in perception is 
about non-material thingsa Vesey will show how either choice has led 
to an inadequate theory of perceptiono This will then give us reason 
for doubting that perception involves judgmento 
One of the alternatives is that the judgment involved in percep-
tion is about material thingso This apparently would mean that one 
judges.things to be what they look like, ioeo" if a thing looks like a 
torpeclo,. then I . .'judge it to be a torpedoa Vesey shows that this is ob-
viously false 1 .because it makes good sense to say, "It looks like a 
torpedo ~;«but cit· isn 1 t. one a" In other words, we do not always judge 
thingscto.be.what they look likeo So we realize this theory· ~s inade-
quateoc· If judgment is involved in perception, it cannot be judgment 
! ,1. 
about 3a~,ma:t.erial .. thing a 
Trhe other alternative agrees that perception involves judgment, 
because only judgment can be true or-false, but di$agrees that these 
' judgments are about material things. According to this alternative, 
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judgment involved in perception is about non-material thingso Vesey 
thinks the reasoning of those holding this alternative, called the 
sense-datum account, is that a material thing can look like something 
it is noto For example, we see something as a snake but since it is a 
stick, we are mistakenQ To make ·a mist;:a.ke means to infer from evidence 
J ' . 
, I 
to a false conclusiono So any situation that has the possibility of a 
mistake involves an inferenceo Unless there is to be an infinite re-
greesion of these mistakes, there must be something I am aware of that 
involves no infer,enceo Since being .1aware of this something must in-
volv~ no possibility of a mistake and so no inference, it must be that 
we are d:i,rectly aware of this thingo This non-material thing is called 
a sense-datumo The sense-datum is than a thing, but not a material 
Since th~ sense-datum. is a thing, it must have fully determinate 
I 
qualitieso A sense-datum cannot be just colored but rather must be a 
particular color, for example green,-must not be just any shade of green 
but a particular shade, peacock greeno This is the basis of why this. 
theory is inadequateo ~ince the sense-data must have fu1lly deter~inate 
~ualities, the theory c~nnot explain why we would make different judg-
ments given the same datao To make this criticism clear, we can consi-
der the following casesg 
Case 1 - We see something as green 
Sense-datuili theory analyzes this into: 
a) We are -directly l;l,Wareof.a. peacock 
green 'colored sense-datumo 
b) We think or judge greeno 
Case 2 - We see something as peacock green 
Sense-datum theory analyzes this into: 
a) We are directly aware of a peacock 
green colored sense-datumo 
b) We think or judge peacock greeno 
Case 3 - We see something as·colored 
Sense-datum theory analyzes this into: 
a) We are directly aware of peacock 
green colored sense-datum. 
b) We think or judge coloredo 
According to this theory there is no explanation as to why we would 
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make these different judgments from the same datao We usually account 
for these different judgments by degrees of attentiono But if we were 
immediately aware of sense-data and sense-data are things, there could 
be no explanation for cases we normally explain by degrees of atteri-
l 
tiono 7 But attention is part of seeing and necessary to perceptiono 
There are then two things wrong with the sense-datum accounto It 
mistakenly assumes that illusions are the result of mistaken judgmentso 
So it maintains that what an object is seen as is the result of a judg-
mento The second mistake is that what we apparently are immediately 
aware of is a thingo 
Since perception has not been analyzed adequately into a judgment 
about a material thing or a judgmentJa.bout a non..:..material thing, we 
have reason to believe that there is no judgment involved in perception. 
More·over, the reason philosophers have thought there was judgment in per-
captions was because illusions or non-veridical perception was under= 
stood as mistakes~ and mistakes were thought to be' the results of in-
oorrect inferenceo 
Vesey has discovered another way to e~plain illusionso· Illusions 
are mistaken perceptions, but mistakes do not have to be considered as 
always the result of a judgmento Judgment doesn't have to be the only 
thing we consider true or falseo We will simply call perceptions true 
or false~ a fal.se perception being roughly a perception in which a ma-
terial object looks like something other than what it iso So if we 
agree that perceptions can be true or false, by,denying the old dogma 
I. 
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that only judgments can be true or false,. then we need not involve judg 
ment in perceptiono 
It is difficult to understand how Vesey thinks declaring that per-
captions are now to be called true a.nd.·fal1'e is going to solve a philo-
sop~ical problem concerning perceptiono This difficulty show~ in the 
fact that we are a bit lost as to what calti!lp; a perception true or 
false would meano It is not a perception report that is now .called 
true or false because these always have been, but the perception itself 
is true or falseo A false perception seems to be what we normally would 
call an illusiono In having an illusion you have something false like 
a box with a false bottom or false teetho 
In attempting to understand '~All seeing is seeing aa, " we have 
seen that the reason for saying perceptions are true and false is that 
it will allow us to give a theory of perception that does not involve 
' . judgmento Hopefully we can have a theory that does not involve judg-
ment because both the possible alternatives of analyzing 'perception' 
as involving judgma~t have been shown to be inadequateo 
To ~urther understand Vesey 1 s own thepry we need to be aware of 
the major pFoblem he thinks a theory of perception must solveo The 
problem is that the facts discovered by psychologists and physiologists 
must be reconciled with the common sense assumption that different peo-
ple are very often aware of the same thingo Reconciling these factors 
was the problem the sense-datum theory was also attempting to solveo 
The fact that some people see a duck-rabbit as a duck while others see 
it as a rabbit informs us that when we see something, what we see it as 
is determined by our psychological background and make upo The ambi-
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guous figures of psychology textbooks are thought to reveal fact& about 
all seeingo With this scientific information we are apparently made a-
ware that perception is a function of both stimulus and receiver. If 
what we see is a function of our psychological background, it seems we 
have reason to say that no two people could ever see ~xactly the same 
thing, yet it is a common assumption that we can see the same things 
other people seeo 
The way Vesey reconciles these factors is to first deny that only 
judgments may be true or falseo So now we do not need to analyze 'see-
ing' as involving data we directly apprehend, which are the result of 
perceiving a material object under conditionso In order to completely 
reconcile the scientific information that we 'see under conditions' and 
the common sense assumption that we can see the same material' object, 
Vesey not only denies that judgment is involved in perception but also 
asserts that we should refuse to use the possession of physiological 
apparatus as a critierion for not seeing the same,any more than we now 
use viewing from different angles as a reason for saying we do not see 
the same thingo Although the sense-datum account would reconcile the 
two' factors, it does not provide an adequate theory of perception, be-
cause it cannot account for attention in perceptiono 
Vesey 0 s theory is that we normally see a stick as a sticko When 
we see a stick as ~ ~nake 9 this mistaken perception is not due to an in-
correct judgment but rather due to a false perception - it is just not 
what it seems to beo Vesey asserts there is no judgment in seeing an 
object as 0X1 o Rather if the object is not "X", it is simply a false 
perceptiono What we are immediately aware of is an object - what the 
material object looks like or what we see it aso 
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An indication of the difference of the sense-datum theory Vesey 
re.jects and his own theory can be shown by noting how both theories 
would account for a case of veridical perception, a case of 'mistaken' 
perception and a case in which we say 'looks like' rather than 'it .is'o 
Veridical perception: I see a sticko 
sense-datum account: 
a) I am aware of a stick shaped sense-datumo 
b) I judge it to be a sticko 
, 
Vesey's own theory: 
· I am aware of the look of a stick and have no 
reason to think the ma~erial object is not what 
it looks likeo' 
'Mistaken' perception: I see a snakeo 
sense-datum account: 
a) I am aware of a stick shaped sense-datumo 
b) I judge it to be a snakeo 
Vesey's own theory: 
I am aware of the look of a snak.e and have no 
reason to think the material object is not what 
it looks likeo Nevertheless the material ob-
ject is not what it looks like and it is a 
false perceptiono 
A case in wh'ich I say 'looks like' rather than 'I see': 
it looks like a snakeo 
sense-datum account: 
a) I am aware of a stick shaped sense-datumo 
b) something about the content (sense-datum 
leads me to say 'looks like 1 rather than 
ur see 1 o 
Vesey 9 s own theory: 
I am aware of the look of a snake but something 
in the context gives me reason to think that this 
is not the material object it looks likeo 
A false perception is defined by Vesey as occurring when the ob-
ject does not look like what it iso 'Looks like' is defined as what I 
would take or judge a material thing to be if I saw it and had no rea-
son to think it was not thato For example, if I look at my coffee cup 
on the table, I suppose Vesey would say, I would take it to be a coffee 
cup because here I have no reason to think it is not a coffee cup, so 
in this case my coffee cup looks like a coffee cup and since it is a 
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coffee cup and looks like what it is, then thi•. is .a case of a true 
I I 
perception., 
Vesey thinks there is a content to perception, and this content is 
t1'1.e same when we say, "It i• a torpedo" and "It looks like a torpedo." 
Whatever we see, we see as somethingo This simply means t.ha.t in any 
case of seeing, I have something or am aware of somethingo I may mis-
identify the material thing, but nevertheless I am aware of something, 
and this something is what the thing looks like to me or what I see it 
aso 
We have the same content in 1 looks like' and 'it is', but when we 
I 
say 'looks like 1 , we have the look plus something in the context that 
makes us think it is not what it looks ·likeo I say it 'looks like' on-
ly when I think it is not what it looks likeo There is no judgment in 
perception, because all perception does is give us evidence for a thing 
being what it looks likeo 1 Looks like' is t,he report of what we be-
lieve to be a false perceptiono Looks are the evidence for judgments 
but do not involve a judgment? or to say it again, what we 'see it as' 
provides evidence for our judging it to be thato When we use the phrase 
1 looks likea, we state what the object would be if we had a true per-
ceptionv but we have reason to believe this is a f.als.e perceptione 
1, 
Seeing What It Look.$ Like 
By looking at the two previous indications of Vesey's meaning for 
"All seeing is seeing as," we have learned what Vesey's theory of per-
L . 
oeption is, but we have not gained much of an understanding of his 
I I 
statement "All seeing is seeing aso" Vesey gives us a third indication 
I 
of his meaning for this statement in the following passage: 
"All 
if a 
like 
like 
seeing is seeing as." In other words 
person sees something at all it must look 
something to him, even if it8only looks 
1 somebody doing '10mething' o . 
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The importance of this point is again emphasized in the ponclusion, 
,j 
"9 "Whenever we see an object, it looks like somethingeo•• So, according 
I 
to Veseyp whenever I see my fountain pen, it looks like something. How-
ever, according to Vesey, since I have E:.Q. reason to think that what I 
see is not a fountain pen, it would be misleading for me to say it looks 
like a fountain pen. This is because we say 'looks like' only when we 
have a reason to believe the object is not what it looks like. When we 
don't have such a reason, we say 'it is' rather than 'it looks like'. 
This is a fundamental point in Vesey's theory because the difference in 
saying 'it is' and 'it looks like' is not in the content of the visual 
exper~ence but in the context of it. The difference in the context is 
that when I say 'looks like' P the circumstances give me reason to doubt 
that it is what it looks like. Vesey states, "We say 'It looks like a 
torpedo 0 when we have reason to believe that the object may not really 
be what it looks like 0 1110 
Now we are in a very strange si tuat,ion. I see my fountain pen but 
if I do, then it looks like something to me and yet I can't say it looks 
like a fountain pen. Oddly enough Vesey's position would have to be 
that it doers. look like a fountain pen but it would be 1misleading; to say 
it. Vesey knows this object looks like a fountain pen because "what an 
object looksliketo a person is what he would judge that object to be, 
if he chad.yno reason to judge otherwise." 11 In my situation I have no 
other •reasons~· so I would judge this to be a fountain pen. Hence it 
looks like a fountain pen, but I cannot correctly say, "It looks like a 
fountain pen." 
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It might seem that Vesey has in mind two sensQs of 'looks like'. 
In a sentence like "We say ''looks like' only wb.en we have doubts that 
it is what it looks like," there seems to be represented one 'looks 
like' which we say and another which an object has. Or one 'looks like' 
that we say and one that we see. But rather than two senses, Vesey says 
in talking about perceptions in which people see things as they judge 
them to be, "These are the cases which provide no occasion for talking 
of what things look like, or what people see things aso 1112 Equating 
1 see things as' with 'looks like', as he does throughout the paper, we 
understand that it is not that there are two senses of 'seeing as' or 
'looks like', but that objects are always seen as ~omething when they 
are seen, but it is only mentioned in cases of doubt as to what the ob-
ject iso 
So, according to Vesey, we always see what things look like, but 
we only mention it when we wish to show that we are not sure what tke 
object iso So if someone looking at my fountain pen in normal circum-
stances asks, "What is t.hat?" it would be confusing for me to say, "It 
looks like a fountain pen," or "I see it as a fountain pen," but never-
. ' 
theless trueo So l~kewise Wittgenstein's remark at a dinner table, "I 
see this fork as a fork," would be misleading but trueo 13 
In order to understand why according to Vesey, it would be mislead-
ing to say "looks like" even when the object we see does look like some-
thing, we need to understand what Vesey means by "looks likeo" Vesey 
begins his articl~ b~ asking ~he question what is the difference in the 
circumstance when we say "looks like" from the circumstance in which we 
say "it iso 11 The difference, as I mentioned abbve, is that in the 
'looks like' case, one has a reason to doubt that the object seen is 
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what it looks likeo There is not only a difference but a similarity in 
these two caseso The similarity between a time in which I say '~It is • 
•• ,"and a time in which I say "It looks like ••• ," is that what I see 
looks the same. The difference is the circumstance in which the visual 
experience occurred, and the similarity is the content of the visual ex-
perience. 
It should be obvious that according to Vesey the content of a vis-
ual experience is the look of a material object, and that it is the same 
in these cases~ If the content wasn't the same in these cases, I would 
say, "It looks different," rather thi;m,"It looks like •••• " This also 
shows that even in the case in which we say, "It is ••• ," there is a look 
because we compare the look in the 'look like' case to this one. If the 
'it is' case didn't have a look, then what would the look in the 'looks 
like' case be like. Indeed what else can we see other than the way an 
object looks? So the reasons Vesey would have us say 'looks like' ra-
ther than 'it is' are first because the content of this visual exper-
ience is the same as in the 'it is', and s~cond, because I doubt the ob-
ject to be what it looks like. 
The fa.ct that according to Vesey the content of a visual experience 
is wh.at the object looks like helps :us to understand Vesey' s sent,ence, 
" ••• 9if a person sees something at allw it must look like something to 
ltim 9 •••• 11 If we see an object, we are aware of its look. To say we 
saw something that didn't look like anything would be to say we had a 
' . 
visual experience without a content. My lack of understanding the sen-
tence" ••• if a person sees something at all it must look like ~omething 
to him ••• " must be as silly to Ve$ey as not understanding, "If a person 
has a toothacke, he must be aware of some pain." 
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Since~ according to Vesey, when we understand that what we are a-
ware of is the look, we no longer actually have an 'I see' case or 'it 
is' caseo The "I see' case is analyzed as being aware of a look plus 
judging the object to be what it looks likeo What an object looks like 
is evidence for what it iso So if we have no counter evidence, we ac-
cept this as conclusive and say "I see o••" or "It is II c. I) 0 
This does not seem as distinct from Le~is' position as one might 
j 
have thought upon noticin~ that Vesey's stated purpose is showing that 
perception does not involve judgmento According to Lewis, we are aware 
of the presentation (recognize it as qualitatively similar to previous 
presentations), and we interpret this presen~ation (predict that the 
same will follow this as did those previous presentations) and so can 
report our perception by saying, "I see 0000 11 According to Vesey, we 
are aware of tb.e look, and if there is no counter evidence, we say "I 
I 
see , II 0 0 d; o. 
There seems to be a difference in these two theories because Vesey 
says judgrnent .. is not involved in perception, wlrlile Lewis lilays perception 
is judgmentalo 14 However, this is only a verbal disagreement because by 
"perception~' :Vesey- means "the way the object we see lookso" A percep-
tion is «t look· an~" there is no judgment in the look of an object. For 
Lewis a;·'.pre,sentation is the look and there is no judgment in the appre-· 
! I I 
hension .of a preS\imtationo However to say "It looks like," "It is" or 
"I see':\ is the result of a judgment based on the evidenceo So for both 
Vesey and~·Lewis saying "I see" is a conclusion based on evidence that we 
obtained by immediate awarenesso Because seeing something is based on 
evidencei we can expect the same consequences that we saw in Lewis. 
With V@sey 1 s theory·we again seemed doomed in a world of probability and 
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so of skepticismo Vesey's "It is" or "I see" are ·based on evidence like 
Lewis'·' so it is difficult to .understand how he could say 'more than "I 
have a great deal of evidence and no reason to doubt that I see a 
snakeo" For Vesey it is not only that sticks look like snakes but that 
snakes look like snakeso Can we strictly speaking say a snake looks 
lik~ a snake or should we actually say looks like what a snake looks 
like:? Instead of introducing his wife in ~he usual "And this is my 
wife" way, Vesey could more accurately SfJ.y, "This looks exactly like my 
wife and in all probability it is she; at least I have no reason to 
doubt ito" 
Such results lead us to see that Vesey 1 s theory of perception is 
n~t a correct analysis of perceptiono But we knew Vesey was essen1ial-
ly wrong since our introductory discussion of the difference between the 
concepts 1 seeing 1 and 'seeing as'. However to under.stand that Vesey is 
mistaken is not to understand why, he made these mistakese 
One basic mistake Vesey makes that lead him to such statements as 
. ~ 
"All seeing is seeing as" is assimilating 'recognizing' (or 'identify-
ing 1 ) and 1 seeing'. First I shall point out that Ve~ey does make this 
assimilation and then that it is a mistake to do soo 
The ,fact that Vesey does assimilate these concepts is revealed in 
the conclusion of the article in which he has argued that 'all seeing 
is seeing as 1 ., He states: 
f 
My aim in.this paper has been to combat the 
idea that'in' seeing a~ obJect as something, 
in recognizin~ an object, there is involved 
a judgmentooo 5 
Another consideration of Vesey's assimilation of 'seeing' and 're-
cognizing 0 is the fact that he begins the article with the contrast be-
tween u it is 1 and 1 looks like' o '.'It is a snake" is a standard reply to 
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questions such as "What is it?" or "What did you identify it as?," not 
"What is there?" It would be more common to make a perception report 
with "There's a snak~" or "A snake!" 
It seems obvious that Ve~ey ie not thinking of a case in which one 
permon has a better view than another and so is asked what he can seeo 
Such a situation would seem to be the more natural setting for percep-
tion reports~ Vesey has in mind two people looking at a stick gathering 
evidence for its being a stick or a snakeo 
The fact that Vesey assimilates 'seeing' and 'recognizing' is im-
portant to us because now we can understand wny he says, 11 All seeing is 
seeing as" or "If you se~ an,object it must look like somethingo" The 
circumstances in which it makes sense to' talk about recognizing are the 
circumstances in which it makes sense to talk about what a thing looks 
like. So by assimilating 'seeing' and 'recognizing', he'overlooks cases 
j 
of Qseeing 1 in which 'looks like' are not involvedo 
So in order to understand that all 'seeing' does not involve 'looks 
like 1 or 0 seeing as 1 P we need to be reminded of cases of 'seeing' which 
do not involve the acts of 1 recognizing'. There may be no act of recog-
nition involved in seeing two oncoming cars and a pedestrian while driv-
illg' to worko Perhaps I can bring this out by contrasting a case of see-
ing a snake and'recognizing it with seeing a snake where there was no 
act of r~cognitiono A snake in the backyard can look like a sticko 
When it, moves, you su,dd.i9nly recognize that it is a snakeo In such a 
case there is an act of recognition and it makes sense to talk about 
j \ ' I i 
what it looked likeo When youl see the snakes in a zoo, there is no act 
I ' 
of recognizing them as snakeso If someone asks if you saw the snakes, 
there would not be a problem in answering him. If you were asked if you 
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recognized them as snakes, you might feel your second grade education 
was being challengedo It is not that ever since the second grade you 
have been able to recognize the snakes in the zoo when you see them. It 
is rather that since the second grade you have not had to recognize the 
snakes at the zooo 
To point out the difference between the concepts of 'seeing' and 
'recognizing', I should also remind the reader of cases such as "I saw 
. ' 
her when she first came in, but I didn't recognize her until she smil-
edo" So there are at least two kinds of cases that point out the dif-
ference in these conceptso There are cases like the last in which I see 
' 
without recognizing, as I can see my sister whom I have not seen for 14 
years without recognizing hero There are also cases like the first kind 
discussed in which what I see does not require an act of recognition, as 
I can see my wife without an act of recognitiono 'Recognizing' is a 
different concept than 'seeing' and obviously ~istinct from 'seeing as 1 o 
One cannot say I recognized that it was a snake but it was a stickG In 
order to recognize or identify, one has to get it righto One can say, 
"I saw it a.s a snake but it was a sticke" 
I have mentioned that Vesey treats 'seeing as' and 'looks like' as 
synonymso There are differences relevant to these terms t~at I have re-
garded as relatively unimportant to this papero Perhaps they should be 
mentionedo usee as 1 does apparently have a use in describing illusions 
as does 1 looks.like 1 o However as 'looks like' implies doubt aboutthe 
object being what it is, 'seeing as' does not imply the speaker has 
doubt but rather that he knows an alternative way it can be seeno The 
reaso:i;i Vesey seems to find no trouble in interchangin~ t~~se is that for 
Vesey there is always an alternativeo We either see things as they are 
(true perceptions) or see things as they are not (false perceptions)o 
But to see things as they aren't, isn't just another way of seeing some-
thingo Also we generalized from the reversible figures illustrated in ' 
the psychology textbooks to all perception. The result of this general-
ization is that perception is a matter of both stimulus and receptoro 
Each of us sees under the conditio~s of his own central nervous system 
and so there is supposed to be some literal sense to saying we see dif-
ferent objects yet the same material objeyto I see things under the 
conditions of my nervous system but others under theirs, so there are 
many alternative ways to see the one material object. Every receptor is 
an alternative way of seeingo 
In order to highlight some of the tangled relationships between 
1 seeing as 1 9 'seeing', 'looks like' and 'recognize' that have been men-
tioned in this chapter, I shall consider a possible objection to each of 
my cases that separate 'recognizing' from 'seeing'. These are objec-
tions someone in Vesey's position might makeo 
In commenting on my ca~e of seeing my sister but not recognizing 
her, one might reply with, "You didn't recognize her as your sister, but 
flltill i.f you saw her, you' at least recognized she was a woman, a human 
being or at least something." Since it has ·been mentioned that to re-
cognize something, I must get it right, one ca~ explain that in seeing 
my sisterv I need not recognize my sistero This can be clearly seen in 
a third person use of see: "He sees h~s sister but he does not recognize 
h.er. 11 1So Ile simply does not recognize what ·he sees. But now what, if 
someone like Vesey was to agree and say, "We don't necessarily recogn:j.ze 
it if we see it, because this would imply we1 never made mistakes, but it 
does look like.s9mething to us. That is, if we see it, then we see it 
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as something but not necessarily as what it iso" 
So again we have the statement: "If you see it, you must see it as 
something." So we ask someone who claims to see it, "What do you see it 
as?" or "What does it look like to you?" Perhaps we get no answer be-
cause the person can think of nothing that looks like the thing he is 
looking at, ioeo, he can think of nothing to ~o~pare it to. Then we ask 
that he at least describe what it l'ooks likeo And surely if he sees it, 
)l . ' 
he can describe what it looks likeo 
A criterion for ,1 seeing' is what our description of what we see iso 
The question about him seeing an object is not always a question about 
perceptiono We could be asking about his abi~ity to identify an object 
o~ perhaps asking to learn about his visual acuityo But this is not Ve-
sey's pointo Perhaps rather than say, "Surely if he sees it, he can de-
scribe what it looks like," we should say, "If he sees it and should re-
cognize it but is unable to, then he will be able to· describe what it 
' 
looks likeo" 
Where we see without recognizing wp.at we see, we can talk about 
'looks like 1 o But in case of seeing my wife in the kitchen, I don't 
have to recognize her and llere it dae'b't make sense to talk about 
1' . 
'looks like 1 o She doesn't look like my wife; she is my wifeo If some-
one asks me who the· woman in the kitchen looked like, I could not answer 
"My wifeo" This means if when you see your wife in the kitch.en and 
someone asks, '--'.'Does she look like your wife?" you would not know how to 
answero But this is not because one doesn't know what she looks like 
but because we don't know what 'looks like' means here. 
A person arguing from Vesey's theory might think that I had over-
looked something important in claiming that seeing my wife does not nor-
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mally involve an act of recognit~on. He might want to say that perhaps 
one does not go through. an act of recognition but still one does recog-
nize his wifeo After all what kind of man couldn't even recognize his 
own wife? It is true that I am not startled as I would be if I came 
home to a strange woman, ioeo, a woman of which it would be true to say 
I didn't recognize her, such as my sister. I might not recognize my 
sister until sometime after I ihad been tord .wlio she waso I might recog-
nize her as soon as.she smi).edo I might recognize hell as soon as I saw 
hero Perhaps I recognize her by her smile or perhaps I say, "Of.course, 
I recognize you; you haven't changed a bit in 14 yearso I just couldn't 
believe it was youo" 
Do I recognize my wife because she hasn't changed a bit? With my 
sister you might say I found out who the woman wasQ I learned who she 
was as soon as I saw her or when she smiled. I don't learn who my wife 
is when I see hero When I see my ~ife 7 I may not learn anythingo Upon 
seeing my sister I might have asked myself or someone else, "Who can 
th.at be?" and not gotten an answer or been able to answer, and th~n al~ 
of a sudden realiz,ed that it was qiy sistero But with my wife in the 
\,. 
kitchen~ I ~o not ask even myself 'who that could beo So it seems 
strange to talk about an act of recognition hereo 
If you say you recognize your wife to contrast this with the case 
of being wit.h someone you don 1 t know, then you should realize that in· 
seeing.your wife, there.was not an act of recognition, as there is· in 
:r·ecognizing your sister. You recognize your wife but not ~ seeing her, 
as you. recognize your sister E;y, seeing hero You recognize your wife but 
th . t f •t• 16 .·ere is no ac o recogni iono 
Above all 7 don't think that in seeing your wife you recognize her, 
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and this means that you compare the way she now looks with what you re-
member her looking like and since the two looks are alike, then you see 
her as your wifeo If one was inclined to think of seeing as comparing 
the way the object looks now to a look or image brought forth by memory, 
then we could expect to hear the person saying, "Whenever you· see, it 
looks like something to you," or. ''.What an object looks like is evidence 
th.at the object is that," or maybe even, "All seeing is seeing aso" Then 
"All seeing is seeing as" would mean that in every case of seeing I com-
pare the object in the kitchen with the one in my mindo I see the one 
in the kitchen as or like the one in my mind. So it is like saying if I 
see it as anything, then I match it with something in my mind. 
If you think saying,"I see my wife in the kitchen" involves com-
• L 
paring the way things look now with a memory image of my wife, then you 
' I I 
might feel inclined to think that "I see my wife" means "I see my wife 
as my wifeo" Thinking that 'seeing' involves comparing what somethin~ 
looks like with a memory image is exactly the same problem Lewis haso 
Remember Lewis had to recognize a presentation in order to give· it an 
interpretation and so see it by matching it with former presentationso 
Also remember Lewis says the only way to refer to the ineffable presen-
tations was with the c:l.rcwhlocution, 'looks'. In the discussion of Le-
wis it was brought out that the idea of a comparison or matching makes 
I .. , 
no sense here because nothing counts as a correct or incorrect compari-
I. 
sono We noticed that if a memory image changed and we forgot this 
change 1.and yet• made ·the correct verbal response, there was simply no 
differenceo And if it makes no difference if you get the comparison 
right or wrong 9 then it makes no sense to talk about a comparisono 
In.other wordsv in our example your memory image changes - first it 
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is your sister, then it is your mother-in-law, then your neighbor, but 
you forget that it caanges and just say, "I see my wife in the kitcheno 11 
.If you were correct in saying that the first time, you will be correct 
in saying that when all these hypothesized inner workings of matching 
and comparing go astray~ 
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CHAPTER IV 
PERCEPTION INVOLVES CONCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION 
Norwood Russell Hanson's concern in his chapter on observation in 
Patterns of Discovery is to find out which sense of 'seeing' is most en-
lightening in the understanding of modern observational physics. He ar-
gues that 'seeing' must be analyzed into •seeing as' and 'seeing that' 
in order to explain the relationship of our visual sensations to our 
knowledge of the world. In analyzing 'seeing' he stat.es: 
I do not mean to identify seeing with. seeing 
!!!o Seeing an X-ray tube is not seeing a 
glas13 ... and-metal object as an X-ray tubeo How-
ever, seeing an antelope and seeing an object 
as an antelope have much.· in common. Some-
thing of the concept of seeing can be discern-
ed from tracing uses of 1 seeing ••• as •• o'. 
Wittgenstein is reluctant to concede this, but 
his reasons are not clear to meo On the con-
trary, the logic of 'seeing as' seems to il-
luminate the general perceptual case. 1 
I have claimed that Wittgenstein is not only "reluctant to concede this" 
but that it is a central theme of chapter xi of Philosophical Investiga-
tions to remind the reader of the differences between 'seeing' and; 'see-
ing as 1 in order to avoid conceptual puzzles. It would then seem that 
Wittgenstein finds the differences :in these concepts important in resol-
' 
ving certain puzzles~ whiie Hanson finds the similarities illuminating 
to a theory of.perception. We have seen the difference between these 
concepts. It will be interesting to understand what Hanson believes to 
I 
be the common element in 1 seeing 1 and 'seeing as' that 'illuminates' the 
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perceptual sense of ',see 1 o 
According to Hanson, 'seeing as' illuminates 'seeing' by providing 
us with clear examples of conceptual organization which is a logical 
feature of perception. Hanson's idea of conceptual organization can be 
partially explained by looking at the following illustrationo 
Figure 5. A Picture Puzzleo 
If you stare at this drawing in bewilderment and then you are informed 
that it is a picture of a soldier and his dog passing behind the corner 
of a building~ the elements in the drawing should 'pull together' or be-
come organized. This organization is then not a detail in the picture 
as the lines are but is rather the way the "details are appreciated." 
The organization gives the lines a pattern. Hanson compares the organ-
ization of our visual impressions to the plot of a story. 
With the duck-rabbit figure one sees it as first a duck, then as 
a rabbit, and one wants to ask what is it that changes. Nothing in the 
object one sees changes. Hanson introduces the notion of organization 
by asking about seeing the different aspects of an ambiguous figure. 
• • • does one 1 s visual picture chang.e? How? 
What is it that changes? What could cp.ange? 
Nothing optical' or sensation~l is:, modified. 
Yet one sees different things. The organiza~ 
tion of what one sees changes. 2 ' 
The above drawing w~s helpful in understanding organization because the 
picture was not at first organized, and we could contrast this with its 
' 
later organization. And in the cases of the ambiguous figures the dif-
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ferent ways the figures are organized results in our actually seeing 
the figures differenjtly, and so tb.e organizationc~.l feature of 'seeing' 
' is again made obviouso The organizational feature is obvious in these 
cases a• it is not in most of our'seeing' because we are normally pro-
vided with a context that psychologically 'sets' us to take the elements 
of our visual experience in a particular wayo Thus Hanson believes that 
we need cases of 'seeing as' to illustrate this logical element involv-
ed in all of our 'seeing'o 
Hanson thus maintains th.at conceptual organization is involved in 
perceptiono Wittgenstein has sli0wn us that there are a number of dif-
1. ~ l 
• 
ferences in our use of 'seeing .as' and 'seeing', so we could not accept 
an argument that simply generalized from cases of 'seeing as' involving. 
organization to the conclusion tb.at all seeing involved organi~ation. 
I 
However, we have seen that there•are similarities between 'seeing' and 
0 seeing as', so it is certainly possible that all seeing does involve 
con~eptual organizatio,no Thus in this chapter we shall be considering 
the question, "Does perception.involve conceptual organization?" We 
will want to consider how Hanson, supports ~is 1• affirmative answer to this 
questiono 
Hanson has two basic arguments to show that perception involves 
conceptual organization. First, a theory of perception must account for 
the fact that we see different things when we look at 1the same object. 
This can be explained if perception involves organization. Second,' a 
the~ry of perception must explain the relation bet~een seein~ and our 
knowledge 9 and this can only be done by a theory that maint,ains that 
I . 
perception involves conceptual organization. Before we can consider 
these arguments, we need to be more fully aware of what Hanson means by 
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'conceptual organization'. I shall first explain Han~on's two senses 
of 'see 1 in order to understand his notion of "conceptua,l organizationo" 
I will then show how each of his arguments fail and then attempt to in-
dicate why I think Hanson,was misled. 
Two Senses of •See' and the Meaning 
of' Conceptual Organization• 
In order to understand Hanson's theory or analysis of perception, 
we must understand Hanson's two senses of 'see'. He begins his concep-
tual investigation of 'seeing' by considering answers to the question, 
"Do Kepler and Tycllo see tlile same thing in the east at dawn?" There is, 
he says, a sense of 'see' in which we would answer this question affir-
matively and a sense in which we would answer it in the negative. These 
two senses of 'see' are illustrated in the,situ~tion of two men looking , 
at the. duck-rabbit. In this situation in which one sees 'it as a rabbit 
and the other sees it as a duck, in one sense of 'see' we can say the 
' 
two men see the same object, while in the other sense we would, accord-
ing to ·.Hanson say they see different thingso 
The more basic sense of 'see', Hanson claims, is the sense in which 
we would say of two men looking at an ambiguous.figure, they 'see' the 
same object., In this sense of 1 see 1 , when we say they see different 
things,,dtsmeans '"th.ey are actually looking at different objects. Thi2' 
sense of ~see' means that the person that sees ~s visually aware of the 
object.:; ,It is tlite logically prior sense of 'see•. There would be no-
thing philosophically perplexing about Tycho and Kepler or ambiguous fi-
gures if there was not a sense in which we say they see the same.· 
~ 
This logically prior sense of 1 see' is the philosophically less in-
teresting sense·· of 'see' , according to Hanson., The more interesting 
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sense is the one in which we see something different when you see it as 
a rabbit and I see it as a duck. This second sense of 'see' is the 
sense illl1minated by 'seeing as'. As I :have indicated, 'seeing as', re-
veals that this sense of 'see' involves organization~. The logically 
prior sense of 'see' does not involve organi~ation. Thus we understand 
.. the central importance of organization in Hanson's theory, because th.is 
is what distinguishes the two senses of 1 see 1 • The difference in see-
ing the duck-rabbit as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit is the organi-
zation of your visual impressiono 
I 
The following example will help to furt~er our und~rstanding of 
what Hanson means by our visual experience having a particular organiz~-
tiono The example is a collection of data suck as Tycho's list of the 
position of Mars at different times. This collection of data just looks 
like a long list of numbers to' most meno They can find no particular 
pattern to the numbers or no reason for a particular number occurring in 
one place in the list rather than in another. Kepler was able to find 
an organization to th.e numbers. He realized that the data showed that 
Mars had an elliptical orbit about the suno He could see a pattern in 
the numbers that others could not see. For him the numbers ha.d an or-
ganization, wbile for others there was no organization until Kepler 
showed it to them. It took Kepler to see the meaning of this series of 
numbers and on the basis of this he was able to make predictions about 
the future position of Marso 
In this example, you are given the numbers and then you look for 
the organization, while our visual experience is not, according to Han-
son, first had and then organized, but rather we just have an organized 
visual experienceo However this illustration of finding the organiza-
tion of a series of numbers does indicate that by 'organization' Hanson, 
means something like understanding what the significance or meaning of 
t~is particular arrangement of numbers iso The example indicates that 
knowledge is involved in the organization. If Kepler had not known the 
formula for an ellipse, he could not have seen the organization of 
Tycho's collection of datao 
An organized visual experience is then one in which we understand 
the pattern of elements as meaningfulo It is one in which our visual 
experience makes sense to uso A visual experience that makes sense is 
one that we can describe with meaningful sentenceso 
Now that we have been introduced to Hanson's two senses of 'see' 
and to his meaning of 'organization', we can further discuss the sense 
of 'see' in which we see the same when we see an ambiguous figuree I 
have mentioned that .this is considered by Hanson the logically prior, 
more basic and philosophically less interesting sense of 'see' and that 
this sense of 'see' does not involve the logical factor of organization. 
This sense of 1 see 1 means that we are visually aware of the object. The 
logically prior sense of 1 see' means visually aware in the sense of 
0 see 0 which we use to say an infant sees something because the infant 
has no knowledge necessary to organize his visual experience. This lack 
of organization is the distinguishing factor of the two senses of 'see'. 
What does 'visually aware' mean and of what are we visually aware? 
According to Hanson, we are visually aware of a sense-datum picture. In 
light of the fact that Hanson spent 1a considerable portion of this chap-
ter on observation criticizing what he labels the sense-datum account 
l 
of perception, my claim that what Hanson thinks we are visually aware of 
is a sense--0.atum picture may seem surprisingo 
10 
The sense-datum account is introduced as one of the ~ossible mean-
ings for two men seeing the same wh~n looking at an ambiguous figure or 
' I I. 
the sense of 'see' in wh.ich we answer ~anson's question, "Do Kepler and 
Tycho see the same in the east at dawn?" affirmativelyo Another possi-
ble but also rejected meaning for Tycho and Kepler 'seeing the same' is 
that 1he,. same c:hemo-physical process would occur in both of their brains 
and eyeso "They see the same" would then mean that they see the same 
retinal pictureso This explanation of th.is sense of 'see', Hanson says, 
is simply the result of careless talko We do not see retinal pictureso 
The pictures on the retina would be small, upside-down and two in num-
bero Besides drunks and drugged people might have the same retinal pie-
tures but not be said to see the same. And finally, according to his 
argument, this is a chemical physical state and seeing is not a state 
but an experience. 3 
Rejecting this explanation of 'seeing the same' when looking at an 
ambiguous figure, Hanson considers the sense-datum accounto In this ac-
count what we mean when we say that we see the same object when we look 
at the ambiguous figure or that Kepler and Tycho see the same is that 
they both have identical sense-datum pictures. A sense-datum picture 
avoids the criticism of the retinal picture because it is a single pie-
ture and it is not ... invertedo To have a sense-datum picture is to be a-
ware of ito We can find out that two people do have identical sens~= 
datum pictures and do see the same in the logically prior sense of 'see' 
by having them draw an exact copy of what they seeo As previously dis-
cussed, people seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck would draw a figure that 
' ' 
was congruent with someone that saw it as a rabbito Because their draw-
ings of what they see would be identical, we would know that their 
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sense-de.tum pictures are identical, and we have a reason for saying 
they see the same thing.' According to this account,the logically prior 
sense of 'see' means that we are aware of a sense-de.tum picture. 
Another way we can find out that they have the same sense-de.tum 
I 
picture is to ask them to describe what they seee However,Kepler and 
Tycho might both say they see the suno This would disguise the real 
sense in which they see the same, because 'sun' would have ambiguous 
visual referento By 'sun' Kepler refers to a static body while Tycho 
means a satellite of the eartho So to get ~o the true sense in whica 
they see the same, we would need to have them describe what they see in 
terms that did not have ambiguous visual referent, such as lines, shapes 
' 
and colorso They would· describe what they saw as a yellow-white disc 
between a patch of green and a patch of blue. Since they both would de-
scribe what they see identically, we have a plausible meaning for 'they 
see the same 1 o 
However, as I mentioned at the beginning of this explanation of 
Hanson's meaning of 'visually aware•, when I claimed that Hanson thought 
we were aware of sense-datum pictures, he is critical of the sense-datum 
''· 
a.ccounto I,n fact he remarks of th.a way we see ambiguous figures, "Could 
anything be more opposed to a sense-datum account of seeing?114 He re-
jects the sense-datum account as a fully adequate account of 'seeing' 
I 
because it does not explain how it is that we see the same object dif-
ferentlyo And this is the sense of •see' that is philosophically inter-
eating.and the sense of •see' in observational physics. According to 
Hanson the sense-datum account explains seeing ambiguous figures differ-
ently as being aware of the same picture but giving it a different in-
terpretationo Taus the sense-datum formula for perception is perception 
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= sense-datum picture + interpretation. 
Hanson rejects this formula because seeing is not a compositeo 
Seeing is an exper,ience and this experience is not a composite. There 
are not two things we do when we seeo There is not a soaking up of sen-
sations and the clamping on of an interpretation. The interpretation is 
there in the seeing and not a second operationo In other words, in the 
formula perception = sense-datum picture + interpretation, it is the 
plus that Hanson is arguing against. 
This agrees with Lewis' acoounto Lewis made it clear as Hanson 
does that we are not concerned about giving a description of what hap-
pens when we see but rather an analysis of 'seeing'. Also both Hanson 
and Lewis agree that in an analysis of 'seeing' there are two logical 
features that need to be made clearo Lewis calls these two logical com-
ponents the ugiven' and 'interpretation' which are made obvious in the 
seeing an object differentlyo Hanson's analysis also depends upon see-
ing an object differently. For Hanson the two locutions 'seeing as' and 
useeing that' point out the lcgical features of seeing that are necfl!I-
, ' 
sary to understand the role seeing plays in observational physicse It 
is important to both Hanson and Lewis that these are logical features 
and not parts of th~ seeing experienceo These are logical features of 
' 
useeing 1 and not psychological facts about seeingo So these two factors 
9an be talked about separate\y but not actually separated any more than 
the weight and· shape of an object can be separated from the object. 
So Hanson's· fundamental reason for rejecting the sense-datum for-
mula of perception is that interpretation is not a psychological compo-
nent of seeing. We could say for Hanson there is interpreting in seeing 
but seeing is not interpreting plus something interpreted. This is an 
. . 
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important point becauae it is necessary in order to understand why Han-
son rejects the sense-datum account and so to understand the possibility 
that he does maintain tll.at what we are visually aware of is a sense-
datum picture. In addition, if we do not understand this, it will seem 
that Hanson merely substitutes hi• own notion of 'organization' for the 
notion of 'interpretation' in the sense-datum accounto What Hanson sees 
himself as doing is substituting the logical analysis of 'seeing' for 
' 
what has before been discussed as the components of the seeing exper-
ienceo 
So whether we discuss organization or interpretation, it is essen-
tial in Hanson's analysis not to think that we receive some element in 
seeing and then interpret it or that we get the elements and then org~-
ize them into a pattern. The interpretation is in the seeing or the 
elements come with an organization. Thi~ organization is different with 
different knowledge, but it is not that we use this knowledge to organ-
ize the elements (lines, shapes, colors) but that this knowledge 'sets' 
us for a particular organizationo 
Hanson's argument that seeing is not something plus interpretation 
is based on seeing the ambiguous figures. According to Hanson, when I 
see an ambiguous figure as a duck, it is not that I first get se~sations 
from the duck-rabbit and then interpret these as a duck. This would be 
the sense-datum account of seeing an ambiguous figure differently, b~t 
it is ambiguous figures that point out how wrong the sense-datum account 
' . ' 
iso If in these ambiguous figures, such as the duck-rabbit, there was 
~ 
a.n interpretation, it would hav' to be a' spontaneous interpretationo 
Hanson 1 s main criticism against this view is thart the word 'ihterpreta-
tion 1 functions in contrast to such spontaneous situations as these am-
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biguous figureso The idea of spontaneous interpretation ma.lees no sense 
in ordinary language nor. is it explained in philoso.phical language. So 
Hanson rejects the sen~e-datum analysis of seeing. 
It is important that Hanson rejects the perception = sense-datum 
picture + int·erpretation formula as an account of seeing only in the 
I 
sense of seeing differently. He rejects the analysis of this sense be-
cause, as is shown by seeing the duck-rabbit dif~erently, this sense of 
.. 
'see' is not a composite and so there is not an interpretation tacked on 
to something else in this sense of 'seeing'. So Hanson does not reject 
the idea that in the sense of •see' in ~hich we say of two men seeing 
different things in an ambiguous figure "they see the same object.," 
'they see' means 'they are aware of a sense-datum picture•. Also he 
does not reject the idea that a sense-datum picture is involved in see-
ing the ambig1lous figure differen~ly. 
So Hans~n 1 s arguments against the sense-datum account do not elimi-
j 
nate the possibility that we are aware of sense-datum pictures~ The 
I ' 
following quotes show that Hanson does think we are aware of sense-datum 
pictures. Remembering that the sense in which the infant sees something 
is the sense meaning he is visually aware of it, the following quote in-
dioates that this sense of 'see' means no more than being visually aware 
of a sense-datum picture. " ••• react to his visual' environment with 
purely sense-datiim responses as does th.e infant or the idiot ••• 115 The 
fact that sense-datum pictures are involved in Hanson's other sense of 
'see 1 that contains the logical feature of organization is shown by Han-
son's comment " ••• for while seeing is at least a 'visual copying' of ob-
jects, it is also more than that. 116 
The primary reason I had for showing that according to Hanson 
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sense-datum pictures are involved in both senses of 'see' was to further 
our understanding of his concept of conceptual organization in order 
that we might more adequately consider his arguments that •seeing as' 
1.· 
illuminates "seeing'. It is now possible to state what Hanson means by 
b.is two sen,~s'of 'see' and by 'conceptual organization' in terms of 
sense-datum pictures. The sense of 'seeing' in which an infant sees 
simply involves being aware of a visual copy or sense-datum picture of 
the object one looks at. Because the infant has no knowledge~ the ele-
I. 
ments of tb.e picture have no organization and thus' what the infant sees 
!I ..I. ' 
means nothing to himo Of course the lines, shapes and colors that are 
the elements of his sense-datum picture have a particular arrangement, 
but this arrangement.means nothing to tb.e infant seer as Tycho's col-
lection of data meant nothing to men before Kepler. In contrast if we 
were to say an adult with knowl'id.ge saw the object, this would mean that· 
the adult would be aware of the same elements but in addition, the pie-
ture would be meaningful. For example, saying that two men see (in-
fant 1 s sense) the same duck-rabbit means they both are aware of a visual 
copy of the duck-rabbit but implies nothing about their organization of 
!.-•~ ' 
this copy. Saying of the two men that they see (adult sense) the ambi-
guous figure differently means t~ey have a visual copy with the same 
elements in them but these pictures have a different meaning for the 
men. An infant cannot see it as a duck or as a rabbit because he does 
not have the knowledge to organize his visual experience, which means 
his visual experience has no meaning to hime Thus according to Hanson, 
the visual world of an infant is a "rhapsodic, kaleidoscopic, senseless 
barrage of sense signals. 117 
Two Arguments for Perception Involving 
Conceptual Organization 
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The previous discussion has given us an understanding of what Han-
mon means by the two senses of •see' and 'conceptual organization'; we 
can now consider his arguments to show tkat perception involves concep-
tual organizationo These arguments are that his theory of perception, 
which maintains this, is more adequate than other theories of perception 
because it can account first for the seeing of ambiguous figures differ-
ently and secondly,for the connection of knowledge and seeing which oth-
er theories fail to do. 
We have seen how Hanson accounts for seeing an ambiguous figure 
differently and how the sense-datum account fails at this point. The 
sense-datum account fails because it accounts for seeing the duck-
rabbit as a duck and as a rabbit by claiming that the same sense-datum 
picture is involved, but the reason it is seen differently is that 
there is a different interpretation of this picture. However, if inter-
pretation is to make sense, it takes time and so it does not make sense 
in the duck-rabbit situation~ Hanson can adequately acCOU?f.t for these 
caseso When we say one person sees it as a duck while the other sees it 
as a rabbitv we simply mean 'see 1 in the sense that involves organiza-
tiono And in this sense of 1 see 1 we say they see different things, be-
cause we mean their sense-datum pictures are organized differentlyo 
In condensed form Hanson's argument looks like this. Other theo-
ries cannot explain our looking at the same object yet seeing different 
things such as happens with ambiguous figures. A theory maintaining 
that perception involves conceptual organization can adequately explain 
seeing ambiguous figures differently and is therefore a more adequate 
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theory of perceptiono Hence perception involves conceptual organiza-
This argument implies that a theory that can explain cases of 'see-
ing as 1 such as the seeing ambiguous figures differently is a more ade-
quate theory of perceptiono So in order for this argument.to be sound, 
'seeing as' must be a part of perceptiono In tne introduction, by not-
ing the differences in the concept of 'seeing as' and •seeing', we maw 
that 'seeing as' is not a part of perception. So because 'seeing as'is 
not a part of perception, this argument of Hanson's to show that percep-
tion involves conceptual organization fails. 
The fact that, since 'seeing as' is not a part of perception, theo-
riee of perception do not have to account for the fact that people can 
see ambiguous figures differently is important. Both Vesey and Hanson 
argue against the sense-datum' picture theory of perception by showing 
that if to perceive something was to have a sense-datum picture, then 
this would not account for seeing an ambiguous figure differently. The 
argument is that if a person seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck and the 
person seeing it as a rabbit both r~present their sense-datum picture 
with a drawing 9 then the drawing may be tlae same and thus not account 
~or the fact that they see different thingso This cannot be used as an 
lt 
argument against sense-datum pictures as a theory of perception, because 
the cases they are trying to criticize the theory for not explaining are 
actually not cases of percepti?n• Here we can see the fundamental na-
ture of Wittgenstein's comment, " 1 Seeing as ••• 1 is not part of percep-
ti on.'.' While Lewis, Vesey and Hanson are refuting theories of percep-
tion because of the theory's inability to account f;or seeihg obje'cts 
differently and then offering their ow~ theories, Wittgenstein is re-
jecting the need to offer an explanation by showing the difference in 
8 t:he concepts. 
The second argument which Hanson offers to show that the correct 
' 
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theory of perception maintains that p9rception involves conceptual or~ 
ganization is that tkis is the only theory .that explains the relevance 
of 'seeing 1 to what we knowe Without the logical features th.at the con-
cepts 'seeing that' and 'seeing as 1 bring out, the way seeing functions 
in science could never be utj~erstoodo As Hanson presents the problem, 
visual consciousness is essentially pictorial, while knowledge is essen-
·tially linguistical, and 'seeing' must bridge this gap. By discussing 
the logical features of 'seeing that 1 , we can understand how conceptual 
organization helps us explain the connection between seeing and our 
knowledgeo After this discussion of 'seeing that', I will show that 
Hanson's argument that perception involving conceptual organization is 
the only way to explain the relationship of our knowledge to aeeing is 
weaker than we would suppose. And finally with a discussion of 'seeing 
as 1 cases, we can understand that this argument fails. 
By the claim that the logical factor of 'seeing that' is involved 
in seeing, Hanson means that we would not say a person could see other 
than in the sense in which the inf ant sees - as visually aware - if the 
person did not have knowledge of the object of sighto This knowledge 
that we must' have in order to have it said that we can see in the sense 
that we say scientists or adults with knqwledge 'se,e' can be expressed 
by the locution °see that'o For example, to see a duck in the adult 
sense is to see that it will fly soutb. for the winter; that the feathers 
on its breast will make a good sleeping bag; that it is a member of a 
certain species, perhaps one on the verge of extinction; that it will 
79 
not dissolve in water; etco To see an object in the adult sense of 
'see' is to 'see that' or know what .observation we could make on the ob-
ject. We will have a list'of things that we know are possible in regard 
to the object and a list of things that we know are impossible, and to 
'see' the object in the adult sense is to 'see that' all these are true. 
Hanson, by using the locution 'see that' rather than 'know', 
stresses his point that 'seeing' is not a compositeo 1 See that' stress-
es that the knowledge is there in the seeing and not something added on 
to ito If he had stated that 'seeing' in the adult sense required that 
we know this list to be true, we might have been misled into thinking 
there were two parts to this 1 seeing 1 o By saying to 1 see 1 is just to 
'see that' the list is true, he emphasizes that 'seeing' is not a com-
positeo 
The relation of knowing to seeing is discussed in several wayso 
Often it is thought that an essential feature of seeing is gaining 
knowledgeo We have to tell blind people such things as, "There's a 
chair just to the right," "Careful now, there are three steps here," 
while our eyes give us all this irifo;rmationo Saying,,, "I see a duck" 
seems to imply that the speaker knows or believes there to be a duck, 
and so seeing seems to be gaining informationo Generalizing from these 
sentences to the conclusion that seeing is knowing seems to be simply a 
mistake of overemphasizing first person present tense perception re-
portso To show that seeing does not always involve gaining knowledge, 
\ 
we simply need to be reminded of common sentences like, "He saw a duck 
but thought it was a rabbito"9 From sensible sentences like th.is, we 
can understand that knowledge is not necessarily gained .by seeing. 
Howeverp although Hanson is concerned about the relevancy of seeing 
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to knowledge, he does not claim that seeing is knowing or that we must 
know what the object we see is. Hanson is not claiming that we need to 
know what it is to see, but rather that we must have knowledge about 
those things that we can be said to 'see' in the adult sense. Using an 
example of Hanson's, it is not that a person needs to know that what he 
saw was a meson· shower, put in order for others to correctly say of him 
that he sees it in an adult sense, he kas to know what meson showers 
areo So Hanson is not arguing that we have to correctly identify what 
we see in order to see it as an adult, but rather that we have to have 
the concept before we can be said to 'see' ito This helps to make it 
clear wh.y Hans.on uses the term 1 conceptual organization' • In the sense 
of 1 see' which involves the logical feature of organization, we can only 
I 
say of people that have the concept of meson shower t~at they see a me-
son showera 
As tke sentence, "He ~aw a duc~·b.ut thougkt it ~as a. rabbit" re-
,, I 
minds us that we do not have to 'know what we see', it might seem that 
a common sentence like, "He does not know what a duck is, but he sees 
one'' would indicate th.at having knowledge of the concept of what we see 
is not a logic~l feature of 'see'Q Hanson would agree that this was a 
sensible sentence, but he wduld add th.is is the sense of 'see,' in which 
an infant seeso Hanson would claim that the sentence was not a counter-
example because we have just changed the sense of 1 see 1 o He would still 
maintain that there was a sense of 'see' that implies we have knowledge 
about the object we are said t© seeo 1 
It seems as· though Hanson's analysis is immune to counter-exampleso 
Each time we would say of another person that he saw although he did not 
have the concept,.Hanson can simply agree that the sentence makes sense 
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and add that it is a different sense of 'see' than the one requiring 
tkat the seer have knowledge. So far Hanson has simply claimed tkat 
there are two sen~es of 'see', only one of wh~ch has the logical element 
of knowledgeo 'So if we find occasions to say of someone, "He sees a 
duck althougll). h.e does not know ,what a duck is," wear~ using •see' in 
the sense not involving the logical feature of knowledgeo 
Is there a sense of •see' in which if the person is kno~n not to 
know anything about the object of sight, then we withdraw our claim that 
he saw it? According to Hanson, this is the case with the ~ense of 
1 see'. that involves the logical feature of conceptual organizationo But 
it seems that we do not ever withdraw our claim that a person sees when 
we are told he does not have any knowledgee Hanson's answer is that 
when we find out the person does not have any knowledge of the object, 
we siill say that he sees but in a different sense. So it is not that 
we ever deny that he sees', but simply that we change the sense of 'see'. 
If one keeps using th.e word 'see' even when the knowledge require-
ment is denied, ho~ does Hanson know there are two senses of 'see'? 
That isp in order for Hanson to show that this is a logical requirement 
of 0 see 0 p he needs to demonstrate that when this requirement of •see' is 
not metv then the claim to 1 see 1 is withdrawno If this never happens, 
Hanson can°t explain this by claiming there are two senses of 'see•, be-
cause we have no reason to believe that there are his two senses of 
0 see 1 o First he has to establish that there are two senses. 
Hanson°s argument would be circular if he said there must be two 
Senses Of Usee 1 t because We don 1 t deny OUr Claim to See When we don't 
-l 
have knowledge of the object 9 but if knowledge is not one of tke logical 
requirements of some sense of 1 see', then we can't explain how 'seeing' 
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is relevant to knowledgeo In other words, Hanson cannot simply insist 
that there must be two senses of 'see' in order to explain the connec-
tion between knowledge and seeing. This would be like asking the ques-
tion,what is the connection between knowledge and seeing and being given 
the answer, knowledge is a logical feature of seeing. Then asking,how 
do you know, and being told, this must be so in order for us to explain 
the connection between knowledge and seeingo Hanson must come up with 
a case that demonstrates the logical requirement of knowledge by showing 
that when the knowledge requirement is not met, then we deny that that 
person could have seen ito Hanson might not have offered us such a case 
because he thought such cases were obviouso I hope to weaken the force 
of his argument that perQ.aption involves conceptual organization by 
showing that cases that Hanson might have had in mind as meeting the 
logical requirements of the adult sense of 'see' do not obviously meet 
these requirementso 
It seems probable that Hanson was thinking about cases in which we 
use the 'see that' locution to meet both tke logical requirements of 
knowledge and of sensationo A reason Hanson would have for so thinking 
' 
is that 1 see that' claims are denied of the person not having knowledgeo 
For example, 11 He could not see th.at it was four o'clock if he does not 
even know what four o'clock meanso" T:he following quote gives an,indi-
cation that Hanson was thinking of the 'seeing that' situations as meet-
ing both requirememts~ "The infant doesn''t see that the element in the 
X~ray tube will heat up and this is precisely what the scientist does 
10 
seeo 11 
In order for 1 see that' to be the sense of 'see' which has the log-
ical element of knowledge and visual awareness that Hanson's analysis 
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demands for one of the uses of 'see', it must be the case that 'seeing 
that' would be denied not only if the person did not have knowledge a-
~ 
bout the object, ,but 'also if the person was not visually aware of: the 
object o It is not. the case that all uses of 'see that 1 have both these 
logical'requirementso It seems to be the case that if one does not know 
anything about X, we would then think it improper to say that· he sees 
that X is the caseo We have examples of 'seeing that X is the case' 
which. do not imply th.at one is visually aware of Xo "I see that Biafra 
surrendered" does not imply that one is visually aware of Biafra sur-
renderingo In many cases 'see that' can be replaced with 'understand' 
without loss of meaning. However, there seem to be cases of 'see that' 
which not only imply that you have certain knowledge about ail object but 
that you are also visually aware of it. For example, "I see that Edna 
wore her most expensive dress tonighto" Here one might th.ink tb.at not 
only must the speaker know Edna and that she is wearing her most expen-
sive dress, but also the speaker must have been visually aware of Edna 
and her dresso But after Edna left her room for the evening her room-
mate might look in her closet an~ not seeing Edna's most expensive dress 
also say, "I see that Edna wore her most expensive dress tonighto" 
Hence for this 'see that' case one need not be vi'sually aware of either 
Edna or her dress. And what if Edna's roommate was blind, would she not 
be able to use this sentence? 
Consider Hanson's example,· 11 Today in science lab, we saw tl:lat ice 
11 
cubes can melto" A student th.at did not see this would be thought not 
to be paying attention or mentally retarded rather than needing glasseso 
In the case of seeing objects we may ask, "Can you see our house from 
here?" and so talk about vision, visually aware and glasses. With the 
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case of seeing that certain facts are true, we cannot ask, "Can you see 
that ice cubes can melt from kere?" Would it be wrong or funny for a 
blind student to use the sentence, "I see that ice can melto" as it 
wo.uld for aim to say "I see t:m.e ice melting?'' For example in the sci-
ence lab, a blind student might ask, "I can see tlll.at ice can melt, but 
I can't see how you got the temperature to increaseo" 
This argument is made difficult by the fact that if 'visually a-
ware' means 'having a sense-datum picture' as it does to Hanson, it is 
l. 
difficult to understand what we need to be visually aware of in order to 
properly say, "I see that ice cubes can melt." I know what a picture of 
ice melting might look like, but I do not know what a picture of'ice can 
melt would be o 
My point here th.at situations in which we use 'see that' are not 
situations in which it is appropriate to talk about visual sensations, 
" ~ 
and so visual sensation not being a logical requirement of this use of 
j 12 
1 see 1 7seems strengthened by an argument of Arthur w. Collins. Collins 
.J 
in arguing a similar point notices the ambiguity in the perception verb 
1 feel 1 o 1Feel' can be used to mean 'my opinion' or' a tactical sensa-
tion 1 o .When 1 feel 1 is used in the locution 'feel that', it means my o-
pinion and there is no referenoe'to'tactical sensationso The difference 
is seen in the contrast between ur·feel 10 oranges in the bag" and "I 
feel that there are 10 oranges in the bago" 
I have.been investigating the locution 'see that' in order to see 
if it involved both the logical features of being visually aware of an 
object and.having knowledge about that objecto I investigated 'seeing 
' 
that u because Hanson spends s·ome of his chapter talking about how 'see 
that 1 closes the gap between pictures and language or between sensations 
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and knowledge and because this locution does have the logical feature 
of knowledge that our previous uses of 'see' lackeda Hanson does n.21 
claim that 'seeing that' involves the logical requirement of being.vis-
~ally awareo This locution was simply a possible use of •see' in the 
sense that 'seeing' haa both knowledge and visually logical features. 
I was searching for the use of 'see' which would be denied if we did not 
know about what we were visually awareo Hanson claims that there is 
such a sense of 'see' but gives no examples. We investigated the locu-
tion of 'seeing that', thinking that it ~ight be such an example; it was 
noto Hence it is not obvious that there is such a sense of 'see' re-
quiring knowledge of the object seeno These were the logical require-
ments of the sense of •see' that involved conceptual organization. 
Another candidate that might be a sense of •see' involving both 
logical features is 'seeing as'. Not.only might this be a sense of 
1 see 1 that involves both logical features but,for Hanson's argument to 
be sound~ it must bee Since according to Hanson's analysis, 'see as' 
' ' 
involves organization and organization involves knowledge, then cases of 
'seeing something as something' must be cases involving this logical 
' ' 
featureo' The sense of 'see 1 opposing the s~mse in which an infant sees 
is the, sense involving :tcnowl6ldge, be?1'.use it takes organization of. ele-
~ents to 1 see 1 in this senseo So the sense of 'see' opposing the sense 
in which an infant sees is 1 seeing as 1' o Hence faced with a case of 
0 meeing·as 1 that does not involve knowledge, Hanson could not claim this 
to be the infant's sense of 'see•. Infants and idiots or people with-
out knowledge cannot 'see as 1 o Hanson's argument that an adequate the-
ory of perception involves conceptual organization could be destroyed if 
one could demonstrate that there are cases of 'seeing as' that do not 
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involve any knowledge. I have two considerations in tkis respect: 1) 
the double cross and 2) the knowledge involved in the duck-rabbito 
Considering the case of seeing a duck-rabbit as a duck, Wittgen-
stein says that we would not say this of a person who .was not familiar 
with the shape of a duck. But being familiar with the, shape of a duck 
is a far cry from the knowledge Hanson would consider essential. Hanson 
talks about knowing a list of possible and impossible observations to 
make of the object of sight, a· list, such as if you see it.as a duck, 
th.en you see th.at it will fly south for the winter, you see that it will 
not dissolve in water, etc. We can imagine a child not knowing anything 
on Hanson's list and yet colorin~ the duck-rabbit yellow as he had been 
taught to color pictures of ducks, and we might say of him, "He sees it 
as a ducks" Therefore, if there is a logical requirement of knowledge 
involved in 1 seeing' tke duck-rabbit as a duck, it is certainly not the 
I 
knowledge of the list of possible and impossible o~servations Hanson is 
concerned with in this sense of 'see' involving conceptual organizationo 
Concerning the double cross that mry'be seen as either a black 
cross on a white background or a white cross on a black background, 
Wittgenstein remarks: 
Those two aspects of the double cross (I shall 
call them the aspects A) might be reported sim-
ply by pointing alternately to an isolated white 
and an isolated black cross. 
One could quite well imagine this as a primi-
tive reaction in a child even before it could 
talko 
(Thus in reporting tlae aspects A we point to a 
part of the double cross.--The duck and rabbit 
aspects could not be described in an analogous 
way.) 
You only 1 see the duck and rabbit aspects' if 
you are already conversant with the shapes of 
those two animals. There is no analogous con-
dition for seeing the aspects A~ 13 · 
Wittgenstein also remarks as I mentioned in the introduction: 
'Now lte 1 8 seeing it like lli!,', 'no.w like !J!!i' 
would only be said of someone capable of mak-
ing cerlain applications of the- figure- quite 
freelyo 4 
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In other words we might say that there is a logical connection between 
'seeing as' and know how or knowing one's way about, but Hanson explic~ 
itly denies that he is interested in 'knowing how' and makes it clear 
that his interest is in the connection between theoretical knowledge and 
seeingo 15 The example of a child co1oring the duck-rabbit yellow as he 
does pictures of ducks, giving us reason to say, "He sees it as a duck" 
I 
indicates that what gives 'seeing as' a use is 'know how' rather than 
knowledge. 
We have understqpd Hanson's two menses of •see•, both involving 
. . ~ 
sense-datum :pictures and having the distinguishing feature of conceptual 
.organization; we have examined his arguments that a theory of perception 
. . 
involving tkis organization is necessary to expl,ain 'seeing' the same 
. . 
object differently and the connect,ipn between knowledge and 'seeing'. 
t . ~ 
We have ~een there is not a reason for a theory of pereeption to explain 
0 seeing 1 ambiguous figures differently. W$ have also seen taat Hanson 
does not establish that there i~ a sense of •see' with the lpgi~al re-
quirements of both having sensations and knowledge, and that it .is not 
obvious tkat there is such a use of 'see•. Finally L kave shown that 
Hanson's sense of •see' does not squ~re with the fact that we do use 
1 seeing as 1 when the person kas no knowledgeo Thus I conclude that Han-
son does not succeed in giving us reason to believe that 'seeing as' il-
luminates 1seeing9 'by showing that perception involves concept'ual organ-
izationo 
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Conceptual Problems in Hanson's Argument 
I will now turn to attempting to indicate why it wam not clear to 
Hanson that his arguments were not successfulo I have previously men-
tioned several reason& that were responsible for Hanson's reasoning. I 
have noted that Hanson's belief that a theory of perception must account 
for seeing ambiguous figur~s is due to Hanson's not realizing that there 
are important differences between th.e concepts of 1 seeing as' and ',see-
ing' a Also if Hanson was thinking that 'seeing that' obviously involves 
visual sensations, this seems to remult from not carefully noticing the 
way this locution is actually usedo 
A partial explanation for Hanson insisting that there are two 
sensee of 'see' is because the infant and the scientist describe wkat 
they see differentlyo The layman mi,ght describe what he sees as a funny 
shaped light bulb while the scientist might describe it as an X-ray 
tubeo According to Hanson, both men are visually'aware of a glass and 
metal object, but we need another sense of see to account for the dif-
ferent .:descriptions we would get if we ask these men what they saw. It 
i8 not that the scientist sees the glams and metal object as an X-ray 
tubeo If we were to say he saw it as an X-ray tube, we would have to be 
able to aay.wh.at else it could be seen aso Although it is obvious that 
it can.be described in various other ways, is there something it can be 
seen aso With: the duck-rabbit we might say, "What you see as a duck can 
also be seen as a rabbit" or perhaps we say, "What in this context is a 
picture, of a'· rabbit col,lld in another context be a picture of a ducko" 
We would not say, "What in th.is context is a funny shaped bulb is in an-
other conte:x:t an X-ray tubeQ" Ratl!.i.er if someone describes what he sees 
as a funny sha.pedligh.t bulb, you migh.t say, "That funny shaped light 
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bulb i111 an X-ray tube." You would not say that a rabbit is a duck. 
"Glass and metal object" and "funny shaped bulb" are d~scriptions of the 
X-ray tube. The glass and metal obj.ect is a funny sh.aped bulb that is 
' 
an X-ray tube., "Duck" and. "rabbit" are not descriptions of the a.mbigu-
oue figures although tkey are descriptions of how we see it. We can't 
say, "The duck is a rabbit that is an ambiguous figure." 
So "glass and metal object," "funny shaped bulb" and "X-ray tube" 
are just different descriptions of the same object. But the fact that 
different people give these different descriptions of an X-ray tube 
seems a reason' Hanson th.inks Wli have a se,cond sense of ' see' • However, 
we don!. t need another sense of 1 see' to account for the fa.ct that they 
describe or identify what they see correctly "ijut differently. It simply 
needs to be noted that it is a common fact to have different ways to 
d~scribe or identify objects. 16 For example, we might ask different 
I 
people·returning from a convention, "Whom did you see at the convlin-
i 
I 
tion?" , Different people might respond with. "Marilyn 1 s father," "Edna's 
husband," "A fellow Rotarian," "A tall dall'k man," etc. ; These descrip-
tions might all be of the ~a.me man~ The fact that different people 
describe .this same man differently does not give us a reason for saying 
there are different senses of 'see•. It is simply the fact that we de-
,sctibe .. the same object in many different ways. We can describe an ob-
ject as an X-ray tube, as a funny shaped light bulb or as a glass and 
metal object, and this is not a rea$on to think that there is a differ-
ent sense of 1 scae 1 G And if we don'j; describe it as a glass and metal 
object but simply draw a picture of it, we have no reason to think tkere 
is a different sense of 'see'o 
One factor that may have played a part in Hanson's thinking that 
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perception involves organization is the fact that all of his examples of 
'seeing as' are of the type that involve what could be called "aspects 
of organization. 111 7 
In several of the illustrations of paradigm uses of 'seeing as' in 
the introduction we might say that when the aspect changes, some of the 
parts pull together that before did not go together. We might say this 
of the staircase figure and the duck-rabbit. Instances such am these 
are the type Hanson uses to illustrate 'seeing as 1 o However, in cases 
such as the triangle - ioe., cases that involve imagination, there is 
nothing to describe as 'organization'o Organization may play a role in 
some instances of 'seeing as', but it does not in all cases. Thinking 
all cases of 'seeing as' are the same, results in thinking that all 
cases of 'seeing as' involve organizational aspects. This might result 
in tlae furtker generalization that all perception involves organization-
al aspects. 
I would now like to consider a question that is fundamental in Han-
son's analysis of 1 seeing' ,o I will consider the question that introduc-
ed 0organization1 o 'Organization' was introduced by Hanson as the ans-
wer to the question, "What changes wken we first see one aspect and then 
another?" FC?r example, we stare at the duck-rabbit figure,· seeing it 
first as a duck' and then as a rabbi to Nothing about the object changeso 
As Hanson says, nothing optical or none of my sensations changeo So we 
wonder what changes a:nd we answer, "The organization." 
Let us examine the question, "What changes?" as it occurs in this 
situationo Wittgenstein indicates that we normally have one of the fol-
lowing crit@ria for something changing. 18 Usually whliln we say that 
something changes 9 there is some part of, the changing thing that remains 
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the sameo For example, when we change a tire on a car 1 tme rest of the 
car remain• the same. However, with a change of aspects a• in an ambi-
guous figure, we have no part that remains the same, but rather the 
whole figure remains the same. Another criterion for something caanging 
is that I can paint a 'before' and 'after' picture tlil.at indicates the 
change. As mentioned previously, the exact copy of wkat I aaw when I 
saw it as a rabbit would be the same as when I saw it as a duck. So 
with a change of aspect, I cannot draw the change. 
So although there seems to be a legitimate use of 'changing as-
pacts•, this perhaps is a different sense than the sense of change about 
which we ask, "Wl!l.at ckanges?" At least this question llas a different 
function in the cases of changing aspect than when it.is asked in a sit-
uation such as a person asking a friend if he noticed anything differ-
' . 
ent and he is to discover what has been changed - her hair style or ~er 
l 
sb.ade of lip stick, etc,;• In this si tua.tion the question, "Wkat JJ.a.s 
' 
changed?" seems to find a more natural role to play. 
ent; 
Wittgenstein asked a.bout a change of aspect, "But 
IJlY impression? my point of view? -·Can I sa.y?1119 
wlil.at is differ-
This suggests the 
question, "Wkat caanges?" does not have ~ sense hereo When the object 
of sigkt changes, we can report this changeo Imagine someone changing 
the arrangement of the furniture in a room and my desQription of the 
change to a blind friend, "Now slte has got the piano wh.ere your old easy 
chair waso" My description tells kim something about the room. My de-
scription·ha.s a use because it helps him to find his way in this new 
arra.ngemento It can be checked on, corrected, said to be accurate or 
inaccurate, true or falseo Now with an aspect change in the same tone 
of voice as before I might say, "Now it's a duck," but this sentence 
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could not serve to describe or report an arrangement. Its function 
might rather be to show how I will go on to treat the figure. If I 
don't describe the changed arrangement of furniture to a friend, he may 
find out about the change by feeling his way around the room. If I 
don't say, "Now it's a duck," people migb.t discover t:N.e changed aspect 
by my behavior toward the objecto 
So although a change of aspect and a change in tae object of per-
ception are described much th.e same, the function of these sentences is 
rather differento The question, "What has been changed?" seemed to fit 
in naturally with changing th~ furniture and wit:ll different crit~ria in 
the change of aspect caseo If we are tempted to answer the question, 
"What changes?" in a change of aspect with "O:rganization," we should re-
member the criterion here is simply our description of the object or the 
way we go on to behaveG 
Hanson also mentions organization in connection with a picture puz-
zlev a drawing that only seems like lines on the page until we are told, 
"It's a soldier and a dogo" Wittgenstein seems to be leading us away 
from the question, "What changes?" in this situatio~, by connecting the 
question,,"What makes the difference PfiltiWeen the look of the picture be-
fo.re and after the solution?n with the questiono "What is the general 
mark of the solution having bEilen f ound?1120 And then he dispels the at-
tempt to answer this question by giving us 16 different reasons we might 
have 1 for calling what we have found, a solution. There is not one thing 
called a solution to such puzzles, so there is no general mark of the 
solution having been found 7 and hence we are not tempted to think there 
is a single answer to "What makEls the difference between tlle look of the 
picture before and after the solution?'' or "What changes?" 
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To note the difference in the question, "What changes?" when it 
occurs in a case of changing aspects and when it occurs in the situation 
where the object of sight has been changed, let us compare the duck as-
pect changing to the rabbit and the arrangement of the furniture chang-
ed in a roomo If 'organization' is the answer to the question when it 
occurs in connection with the ambiguous figure, then we should note that 
'organization' does not serve to explain what changed the way the answer 
"The arrangement of the furniture" might. If organization was an expla-
nation like the arrangement, it would be an empirical claimo One could 
be wrong that what changed in the room was the arrangement of furniture. 
I mi~ht have to look again to see if it was the arrangement that was 
different• The arrangement of furniture could be qhanged and I not even 
notice ita Can the organization of the duak-rabbit be changed and I not 
notice it? Is it possible but not true that I have the duck organiza-
tion and yet see it as a rabbit? 
How does the answer, 'organization' help? Is it that when we see 
different thingsp there are two possible explanations: the organization 
of what we see is different or the object itself is differento So the 
answer~ vorganization',distinguishes between these two possibilities. 
There is only one way to see different things and that is if the object 
is differenta There is no seeing the same object but seeing different 
thingsyalthough there is seeing the same object as different thingsa 
Thinking that there is some other way to see different things besides 
seeing ~ifferent things is simply assimilating the concept of 'seeing 
as v to 'seeing' a 
The a.nswer to "What has changed?" in connection with the furniture 
can explain why the room looks different. The answer to "What has 
changed?" in the case of ambiguous figures cannot explain the fact that 
we now see it as something differ~nt. However, 'organization' might 
mark the contrast in seeing the duck-rabbit difterently and in seeing 
the triangle as a mountain. If Hanson ignored the differences in the 
questions of what changed 9 he might think he had noted something that 
could be involved in an explanation of what we something as. 
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SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis has been to clarify the differences 
between the concepts 'seeing as' and 'seeing' and to understand the sig-
nificance of these differences. 
In order to understand the differences between the concepts 'seeing 
as' and 1 ~eeing', it was shown how Wittgenstein would support his claim 
that" 'Seeing as ••• • is not part of perception~" Wittgenstein has 
pointed out such differences as the1fact 1that we can draw an exact copy 
to show what we see, whereas an exact copy will not show what we see it 
aso Wittgenstein has reminded us that the paradigm uses of 'seeing as' 
are,in connection.with ambiguous figures such as the duck-rabbit rather 
than as perception reports used to answer the question. "What is there?" 
Wheri we sayo "I see a duck," it implies there is a duck; on the other 
hand, when we say, 11 I see it as a duck, 11 the. ' it ' cannot be a normal-. 
looking duck in plain sightG When we say, "I see it as a duck" or "He 
sees it as a duck," we imply that there is another way that the figure 
can be SEHmo We have ,also, noticed that there are differences in the 
different figures used as paradigms of 'seeing as'; some of these in-
volve imagination, some involve having a familiarity with different 
shapes? some involve the possibility o~ illusions. 
In order to show that 'seeing as' was involved in theories of per-
ception9 two ways were mentioned that thi~ concept becomes involved in 
theories of perceptiono The first way is as a locutiqn to state illu-
~ions and the seeing of ambiguous figures; theories of perception at-
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tempt to explain both of these. The second way is in theories that in-
volve basic elements of perception such as color patches and lines. 
These theories must explain the fact that we see houses, trees and peo-
ple rather than just line's and colorso This is sometimes done by saying 
we !!!,! the lines and colors ~ a house. 
This discussion showed 'seeing as' was involved in these theories, 
but in order to demonstrate the significance of 'seeing as' in the anal-
ysis of perception, three th.eories were examine.d which either e:x:plici t-
ly or implicitly in their arguments claimed that 'seeing as' was a part 
of perception. It was then shown how each of these theories was inad-
equate because of the failure to consider the conceptual differences be-
tween 'seeing' anGl: 'seeing as•. 
I ' 
In tlte discussion of each of t,h.e three theories of perception we 
saw how the theory involved the assimilation of 'seeing as' to •seeing'. 
In each case the author rejected previous theories of perception on the 
basis of their inability to account for situations in which it is appro-
priate to use the 'seeing as' locution, and then attempted to offer an 
analysis of 'seeing' that would adequately account for these instances 
of 'seeing as 1 o Thus Wittgenstein's reminders of the difference between 
I ' 
these concepts had the effect of denying the validity of these cases as 
a criterion for an adequate theory of perception. 
In the discussion of each of the three theories of, perception we 
saw not only how the assimilation of 'seeing as' and 'seeing' led to at-
tempts to offer adequate explanations of seeing the same thing differ-
ently 9 but how this confusion involves the theory in other confusionsv 
With Lewis we saw that overlooking the difference in 'seeing' and 
useeing a$u resulted in 'seeing' meaning 'interpreting presentations'. 
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It was pointed out tkat 'seeing as' and 'interpreting' both involved al-. 
ternatives and so although 'interpreting' implies the need of more in-
formation and so is very different from both 'seeing' and 'seeing as', 
the similarity of 'seeing as' and 'interpr~ting' and the assimilation 
of 'seeing' and 'seeing as' was partly responsible for Lewis' claim that 
'seeing' was 'interpreting'o Also the fact that 'seeing as' suggests a 
comparison led Lewis to think that all 'seeing' involves a comparison 
between presentations and memory images of former presentationso We saw 
that although 'seeing as' may have tempted us to think there was a com-
parison involved in seeing, this comparison made no sense, because there 
was no sense to verifying ito 
In understanding Vesey's theory of perception we found him to have 
a view surprisingly close to Lewis'. Although he argued against there 
being judgment in perception, this was only a verbal disagreement with 
Lewiso Vesey made the claim that "All seeing is seeing am." Remember-
ing our previous discussion of the differences in the concepts 'seeing' 
and 'seeing as', we realized the statement was false. It was understood 
that Vesey meant by this statement that whenever we see, what we see 
looks like something or is seen as something. We saw that this was due 
in part to Vesey confusing the concepts 'seeing' and 'recognizing'. In 
situations in which it is proper to use 'recognize', it is appropriate 
to .. talk about 1 looklll like' , but thi111 is not always appropriate in cases 
of 1 seeing 1 o 
In the discussion of Hanson's theory of perception, the idea was 
examined that perception involves conceptual organizationo Here it was 
argued that since 'seeing as' is not a part of perception, a theory of 
perception does not need to account for seeing ambiguous figures differ-
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ently, and that Hanson did not provide us with a sense of 'see' which 
would be withdrawn if the person was proven not to have the concept of 
what he was suppoaed to aee. Th~e showea tkat· Hanson had not given us 
reason to believe that perception involves conceptual organization. In 
this discussion it was suggested that 'seeing that' does not involve be-
ing visually aware of somethingo It was argued that asking, "What 
changed?" in connection with the ambiguous figure led Hanson to believe 
that he had found a factor that helped explain perception. 
Thus we have seen the significance of noting the differences be-
tween the concepts 'seeing' and 'seeing as'o Noting the differences 
between these concepts helps us not only to appreciate the significance 
of Wittgenstein's claim but promotes a better understanding of the pas-
sages in chapter xi of Philosophical Investigations. Emphasizing his 
claim of the differences in these concepts facilitates the organization 
of much of the material in this chapter. 
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